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GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 
SUNGJOON CHO* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article identifies a nascent phenomenon of “global 
constitutional lawmaking” in recent World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) jurisprudence that struck down a certain calculative 
methodology (“zeroing”) in the anti-dumping area.  This Article 
interprets the Appellate Body’s uncharacteristic anti-zeroing 
hermeneutics, which departs from a traditional treaty 
interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and the past pro-zeroing under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) case law, as a “constitutional” turn of the 
WTO.  The Article argues that a positivist, inter-governmental 
mode of thinking, as is prevalent in other international 
organizations such as the United Nations, cannot fully expound 
this phenomenon.  Critically, this turn originates from bold ideas 
which envision, and thus “constitute,” new institutional meanings 
and possibilities within the WTO.  They are anchored firmly by the 
discernible purpose of cabining distortive and restrictive trade 
consequences from the use of zeroing which have long been left 
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unchecked.  Exogenous factors, such as domestic political support, 
and endogenous factors, such as normative recognition by the 
domestic legal system (“internalization”), can secure the legitimacy 
and sustainability of such constitutional lawmaking. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Can we conceive “constitutional” norms at the global level 
beyond the nation-state?  Conventional international relations 
(“IR”) scholars may be lukewarm to this c-word because it tends to 
menace their ontological premise, i.e., state-centeredness.1  This 
Article challenges that mainstream view.  It argues that under 
certain circumstances global organizations may self-generate 
constitutional norms in an effort to regulate states’ behaviors that 
ambiguous treaty provisions may not fully capture.  The Article 
finds a case in point in a recent development concerning a technical 
issue in the WTO.2  This Article explores the dynamic process of 
global constitutional law-making—namely how global 
organizations, such as the WTO, can actually build constitutional 
norms within their institutional contexts.3 
Ironically, the WTO’s constitutional revolution originated from 
a rather unspectacular calculative methodology in the 
antidumping remedy known as “zeroing.”4  The WTO texts do not 
 
1 See J.H.H. Weiler & Joel P. Trachtman, European Constitutionalism and Its 
Discontents, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 354, 363 (1996–97) (observing that the 
“continued centrality of the national and the state is ontologically necessary” to 
conventional IR scholars); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and 
International Regimes, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 631 (2009) (stating that 
mainstream IR theorists have often refused to recognize an international 
organization’s capacity to “develop autonomous capacities to produce, monitor, 
and enforce legal norms.”). 
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement]. 
3 See Karolina Milewicz, Emerging Patterns of Global Constitutionalization: 
Toward a Conceptual Framework, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 413, 422 (2009) 
(contending that global constitutionalism is a “process of continuous 
development,” rather than a “final good” akin to domestic constitutions).  
Another critical aspect of global constitution lawmaking is in the area of “human 
rights.”  For an argument regarding the human rights dimension of global 
constitutionalism, see Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International 
Constitutional Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008). 
4 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate Body Strikes Down the U.S. 
Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL INSIGHTS, May 4, 
2006, http://www.asil.org/insights060504.cfm (providing background on zeroing 
and the Appellate Body’s reaction to zeroing). 
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explicitly prohibit this practice, and public international law 
principles, such as in dubio mitius,5 recognizes its members’ 
discretion to freely adopt the practice. 6  In fact, in what might 
constitute “useful guidance,” a panel7 under the old General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) previously upheld the 
same measure.8  Moreover, the WTO Antidumping Agreement 
stipulates that when a provision “admits of more than one 
permissible interpretation,” a WTO tribunal, such as the Appellate 
Body (“AB”), shall validate a domestic authority’s antidumping 
measure “if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.”9  
Under traditional rules on treaty interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), the WTO tribunal 
would simply endorse the practice since it would interpret the 
Antidumping Agreement in a literal fashion. 
Surprisingly, however, the AB, in a series of high-profile 
decisions, recently struck down all types of zeroing methodology 
challenged thus far.10  These decisions are not a mere collection of 
inadvertent rulings on the same subject; rather, they constitute a 
deliberate and systematic pattern toward a new jurisprudence in 
this area.  The question then becomes whether, and how, the AB’s 
 
5 This principle is a tool of treaty interpretation that gives deference to state 
sovereignty.  If the meaning of a treaty term is ambiguous, the preferred meaning 
is that which is “the less onerous meaning to the party which assumes the 
obligation, or which interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of 
a party, or involves less general restrictions upon the parties.”  1 OPPENHEIM’S 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 
1992). 
6 This discretion is a long-recognized public international law principle.  See 
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7) (stating that 
sovereign states enjoy “a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in 
certain cases by prohibitive rules”). 
7 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. XVI, para. 1 (“[T]he WTO shall be 
guided by the decisions, procedures and customary practices followed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the 
framework of GATT 1947.”); Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages, 13, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) 
[hereinafter Shochu II] (finding that the reasoning of an unadopted panel report 
may still provide “useful guidance”). 
8 Report of the Panel, EC—Anti-Dumping Duties on Audio Tapes in Cassettes 
Originating in Japan, ADP/136 (Apr. 28, 1995) (unadopted) [hereinafter EC—
Cassettes]. 
9 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1A, art. 17.6 (ii) 
[hereinafter AD Agreement]. 
10 See generally, infra, Section 2.3. 
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uncharacteristic stance could be justified in the face of traditional 
public international law, the GATT precedent, and the 
Antidumping Agreement, all of which appear to conflict with the 
AB’s position. 
This Article construes the AB’s anti-zeroing position not as a 
simple jurisprudential change but as a more serious judicial 
revolution, which is tantamount to “constitutional lawmaking” in 
its determined endeavor to contain WTO members’ manipulative 
use of zeroing methodologies under the subterfuge of the textual 
ambiguity of the relevant WTO norms.  The AB, this Article 
contends, has firmly recognized the structural damage that 
zeroing, if left unchecked, could inflict on the global trading 
system through the propagation of antidumping measures.  At first 
glance, the AB’s departure from the old GATT case law might 
appear neither inevitable nor stunning.  Admittedly, not all 
interpretive shifts deserve the “constitutional” label.  Critically, 
however, it is not the shift itself but the nature of the shift which 
should draw our attention to this development.  Both the subject 
matter and the unique topicality of the zeroing decisions render the 
AB’s jurisprudential shift constitutional lawmaking via 
international adjudication. 
First, despite the missing “Constitution”—with a capital “C”—
global organizations may still need to reconfigure the power 
allocated among themselves and their members with respect to 
measures that seriously undermine their ultimate object and 
purpose.  To that end, certain fundamental, constitutional norms 
within the meaning of the WTO should tame an egregious form of 
protectionist politics that the zeroing practice denotes.  The 
unparalleled evolution over a half century, from a provisional pact 
among a few contracting parties—GATT—to a full-blown 
multilateral trading system as a public good—WTO—tends to 
provide institutional maturity befitting such a constitutional 
mission. 
Markedly, global constitutional lawmaking in the form of 
constitutional adjudication in the WTO has not sprung from a 
vacuum.  One can fully capture this nascent phenomenon only 
with critical appreciation of certain historical contexts, namely the 
unique topicality of zeroing and antidumping measures at present. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/1
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Trade remedies, such as antidumping measures, are widely 
prone to protectionism.11  The use of antidumping remedies has 
recently skyrocketed and they are rapidly replacing more 
conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, which 
rounds of trade talks have gradually demolished.  WTO members 
now invoke antidumping measures competitively and with 
alarming frequency and intensity.  Since the launch of the WTO in 
1995, WTO members have initiated about 3,100 antidumping 
investigations.12  In stark contrast, GATT contracting parties 
initiated only 1,600 investigations in the four decades before the 
1980s.  More demoralizing is the antidumping measures’ highly 
contagious nature.13  In what appears to be a defensive attack, 
countries that have recently been globalizing—such as India, Brazil 
and China—have now begun to imitate the developed countries’ 
penchants for antidumping suits.14 
To make matters worse, the current global financial crisis has 
exacerbated this already alarming trend.  In a protectionist reaction 
to the crisis, trading nations initiated more than two hundred new 
antidumping investigations in 2008, an increase of nearly one-third 
from 2007.15  Since zeroing can inflate dumping margins by as 
much as 86%,16 the practice is likely to fuel the abuse of 
 
11 See generally Sungjoon Cho, Anticompetitive Trade Remedies: How 
Antidumping Measures Obstruct Market Competition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 357 (2009) 
(arguing that antidumping measures often protect domestic producers at the 
expense of market competition). 
12 For antidumping statistics from the WTO, see WTO, ANTI-DUMPING, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 
2010) [hereinafter WTO AD Website]. 
13 For statistics, see WTO, AD INITIATIONS: BY REPORTING MEMBER FROM: 
01/01/95 TO: 31/12/08, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/ad_init 
_rep_member_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
14 Major developing countries have increasingly used the anti-dumping 
measures since the launch of the WTO.  WTO, AD INITIATIONS: BY EXPORTING 
COUNTRY FROM: 01/01/95 TO: 31/12/08, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop 
_e/adp_e/ad_init_exp_country_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
15 Press Release, WTO, WTO Secretariat Reports Increase of New 
Antidumping Investigations, (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.wto.org 
/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm.  See Robert Guy Matthews, Steelmakers 
Accuse China of Dumping in the U.S., WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at B1 (reporting that 
the recent $2.7 billion antidumping suit launched by U.S. steelmakers against 
Chinese exporters may indicate  the beginning of a string of steel-dumping cases 
against China). 
16 Daniel Ikenson, Antidumping Reformers Rejoice, CATO@LIBERTY 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/12/18/antidumping-reformers-rejoice/ 
(Dec. 18, 2006). 
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antidumping measures, if it remains intact.  In short, zeroing could 
wreak havoc on the global trading system. 
These disturbing developments within the global trading 
system, have prompted the WTO high court, the Appellate Body, 
to cultivate a new hermeneutics on the WTO Antidumping 
Agreement, one that envisions new institutional meanings and 
possibilities within the WTO that resonate with its telos:17  “an 
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system.”18  
This critical choice flows from the AB’s awareness of the 
immediate and powerful normative consequences that would 
affect the future of the WTO.  In other words, the AB was well 
aware that the AB’s adjudication would “(re) constitute” the WTO, 
at least as far as antidumping is concerned.  Here, the AB departed 
from a conventional role of a triadic settler, or arbiter, of disputes 
and instead assumes the innovative role of a “constitutional 
court.”19 
At this juncture, articulating what this Article does not present, 
or represent, is in order.  This Article does not claim that its thesis 
provides an exclusive lens through which one may investigate 
constitutional phenomena in global organizations like the WTO.  
There are certainly different ways in which one can appreciate 
constitutional issues in those organizations.20  Nor does this Article 
attempt to construct a grand theory of the “WTO Constitution,” a 
project many scholars appear to have undertaken.21  In essence, 
this Article captures and theorizes one notable constitutional 
dynamic as it emerges in the WTO. 
Against this backdrop, my thesis of global constitutional 
lawmaking unfolds in the following sequence.  Section 2 
documents the jurisprudential transformation the zeroing practice 
 
17 See Kenneth W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The 
Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971, 974 (1996) 
(“Economic and political structures are not corporeal things; they owe their 
existence to constitutive ideas . . . .”). 
18 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl. 
19 See Sweet, supra note 1, at 640 (highlighting the “constitutional 
jurisdiction” of the highest courts, such as the WTO Appellate Body, for 
reviewing members’ domestic measures in light of the WTO regime). 
20 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving 
Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2004) (arguing that the WTO, in 
alliance with other international institutions, must develop a synergistic linking 
within the constitutional structure of the global trading system). 
21 See infra Section 3.1.1. 
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underwent between the old GATT and the new WTO.  The AB’s 
judicial abolition of zeroing is anchored firmly by a discernible 
purpose:  avoiding unfairness from an undue inflation of dumping 
margins and minimizing uncertainty in administering 
antidumping measures.  Methodologically, the use of interstitial 
norms, such as fairness, tends to furnish the AB with maneuvering 
room for this teleological interpretation.22 
Section 3 then attempts to conceptualize the AB’s judicial 
revolution on zeroing through the conceptual lens of 
“constitutional lawmaking,” which authoritatively reconfigures the 
distribution of regulatory competence between the WTO and its 
members.  This Section highlights the AB’s innovative undertaking 
of constitutional adjudication as a vehicle for constitutional 
lawmaking in the WTO.  It also discusses the normative 
consequences of such constitutional lawmaking as they relate to 
WTO members and the WTO’s lower court, the panel.  Finally, it 
argues that the normative supremacy of constitutional norms 
created by constitutional lawmaking applies to both WTO 
members and panels. 
Section 4 defends the AB’s constitutional lawmaking in the 
form of constitutional adjudication.  Admittedly, the AB’s 
constitutional adjudication is not without opposition.  It has 
sparked harsh criticisms, with accusations ranging from charges of 
judicial activism23 to being a “kangaroo court.”24  This Section 
 
22 See Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character 
of Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS 
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 207, 217 (M. Byers ed., 
2000) (observing that tribunals employ interstitial norms “not because those 
norms are obligatory as a matter of law, but because they are necessary in order 
that legal reasoning should proceed”).  These interstitial norms function as 
“standards” vis-à-vis “rules” in an adjudicative setting.  See Joel R. Trachtman, The 
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 350–55 (1999) (generally 
discussing WTO rules and standards). 
23 The United States, an ever-present defendant in these anti-zeroing 
decisions, has denounced the AB’s anti-zeroing position as an improper form of 
judicial legislation because it “[makes] up rules that the United States never 
negotiated.”  Press Release, U.S. Sen. Comm. on Finance, U.S. Trade Laws and 
WTO, (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf.  
Likewise, others have also asserted that the AB has violated the sovereignty-
preserving standard of review enshrined under Article 17.6 (ii) of the 
Antidumping Agreement, which they contend is modeled after the United States’ 
Chevron doctrine.  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984).  See also Roger P. Alford, Reflections on US—Zeroing: A Study in Judicial 
Overreaching by the WTO Appellate Body, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 196, 200–02 
(2006) (analogizing the Chevron doctrine to the zeroing and antidumping context 
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responds to these criticisms by contending that international 
tribunals, like domestic courts, often engage in judicial rule-
making via construction beyond mere mechanical application of 
treaty provisions.  It also warns that any “disarticulated,” self-
righteous concept of sovereignty mobilized to foreclose necessary 
discussions in this area does not do justice to the contemporary 
status of global market integration under the WTO system.25 
Section 5 deals with an evaluative aspect of the thesis.  It first 
observes that exogenous factors such as domestic political support 
may not exhaust legitimizing bases for global constitutional 
lawmaking.  This Section emphasizes those “endogenous” factors, 
such as normative recognition by the domestic legal system 
(“internalization”) that will eventually secure the legitimacy and 
sustainability of such constitutional lawmaking. 
Finally, this Article concludes in Section 6 that constitutional 
culture in the global trading community—which harbors and 
promotes a legal discourse of constitutional jurisprudence among 
the community participants—is a critical catalyst for constitutional 
lawmaking.  Because trade inherently connotes a “transnational” 
value, participants—importers, exporters, consumers and 
investors—in the global trading community tend to be susceptible 
to such discourse.  It is this constitutional culture within the WTO 
that liberates us from myopic mercantilism, which zeroing 
embodies, and leads us to embrace the constructive normative 
possibilities envisaged by the multilateral trading system, 
particularly amid the current global economic crisis.  Only this 
liberation can redefine WTO members’ interests, and their 
identities, from unreceptive or unapologetic advocates of state 
sovereignty to enlightened norm-builders.26 
 
to argue that “reasonable interpretations by Member States should be upheld by 
WTO panels”). 
24 Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Baucus Calls WTO ‘Kangaroo Court’ with Strong ‘Bias’ 
Against the United States, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. 167 (2002). 
25 See Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 
88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384, 393 (1994) (advocating harmony between “democratic 
and international relations theorists”); Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and 
Sovereignty, 103 ETHICS 48, 48 (1992) (noting that political scientists are looking at 
“grand pictures” that political scientists are looking at). 
26 See generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 
541–42 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Gemeinschaft] (suggesting a move toward greater 
“global empathy”); Andrew T. F. Lang, Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John 
Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade 
Regime, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 81 (2006) (analyzing the normative underpinnings of the 
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2. A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
2.1. “Zeroing”: The Epicenter of the Revolution 
Dumping is a pricing strategy under which foreign producers 
export their products at less than fair (normal) value, such as at 
prices lower than their home prices or at prices below the cost of 
production plus normal profits.27  Anti-dumping authorities and 
the beneficiaries of anti-dumping measures, i.e., domestic 
producers, attempt to justify the anti-dumping system as a 
bulwark against foreign producers’ alleged “unfair” trade practices 
which enable the latter to reduce the production cost.28  Since these 
discounted sales are legitimate under domestic antitrust laws, 
unless they are motivated by a predatory intent to drive out rivals 
from the market,29 a number of economists and policymakers view 
the anti-dumping system, which lacks such strict requirements, in 
a negative light.30  Yet the GATT/WTO “does not pass judgment” 
on the fairness of dumping.31  Instead, GATT Article VI authorizes 
importing countries to “condemn” dumping if it incurs material 
injury to domestic industries by imposing anti-dumping duties on 
dumped imports.32  In other words, under these circumstances, 
 
international trade regime).  From the standpoint of sociological institutionalism, 
Martha Finnemore envisioned “continuing and even increasing adherence to 
multilateralism—even when it runs contrary to expressed national interests—
because it embodies some set of values central to the larger world culture.”  
Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology’s 
Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996). 
27 19 U.S.C. § 1677, 34 (2009) (stating that sale at less than fair value 
constitutes dumping). 
28 See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED:  THE 
DEVILISH DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW, xi (2003). 
29 However, “predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more 
rarely successful.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
589 (1986). 
30 Alan Greenspan once observed that anti-dumping remedies are oftentimes 
“just simple guises for inhibiting competition” imposed in the name of “fair 
trade.”  Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating 
Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725, 725 (2000) (quoting Alan Greenspan, former 
Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Remarks Before the Dallas Ambassadors Forum 
(Apr. 16, 1999)). 
31 WTO AD Website, supra note 12. 
32 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187; AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 1. 
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importing countries may impose anti-dumping duties on dumped 
products to offset any allegedly unfair effects. 
Under a typical anti-dumping investigation, the amount of 
anti-dumping duties corresponds with the magnitude of dumping 
(“dumping margin”), which is defined as a gap between domestic 
price (normal value) and export price.  In the United States, the 
Department of Commerce (“DOC”) calculates dumping margins.  
The DOC determines an overall dumping margin over a particular 
product under investigation by adding up multiple dumping 
margins (“Potential Uncollectible Dumping Duties” or “PUDD”) 
collected from various sub-product groups (“averaging groups” 
specified by “Control Numbers” or “CONNUM”) of the same 
product.33  In doing so, the DOC ignores (“zeros”) any “negative” 
PUDD (any excess of export prices over normal values) in each 
group.  Consequently, an overall dumping margin (a total sum of 
multiple PUDDs) is inflated since the zeroing methodology 
prevents those negative individual dumping margins from 
offsetting positive individual dumping margins.  According to one 
study, dumping margins would have been 86% lower if zeroing 
had not been employed.34  The DOC uses this methodology not 
only in an original investigation but also in the subsequent stage of 
investigation, such as an “administrative review” under which it 
may annually compute a company-specific dumping margin upon 
a request by interested parties.35 
Suppose that a foreign widget producer makes two U.S. sales.36  
The first U.S. sale (export) concerns Model A, and is given 
CONNUM #1.  This sale is made at fifty cents per unit with 100 
units.  The second sale involves Model B, and is assigned 
CONNUM #2.  This sale is made at a dollar and fifty cents per unit 
with 100 units.  The weighted-average normal value (home market 
price) is one dollar in both sales.  The weighted-average margin for 
the first and the second sale is 50 cents and minus 50 cents, 
respectively.  Each PUDD is calculated as a unit margin multiplied 
 
33 See IMPORT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, ch. 6 
(Fair Value Comparisons), available at http://ia.ita.doc.gov/admanual/index.html 
[hereinafter AD MANUAL] (discussing the detailed methodology of the DOC’s 
calculation of dumping margins). 
34 Ikenson, supra note 16. 
35 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a) (2008) (mandating methods for periodic review of the 
amount of the anti-dumping duty). 
36  AD MANUAL, supra note 33. 
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by total units sold.  In the U.S. sale No.1 (CONNUM #1), the 
PUDD is 50 dollars, while in the U.S. sale No.2 (CONNUM #2) the 
PUDD is minus 50 dollars.  The total PUDD is a sum of these 
individual PUDDs.  In this example, the total PUDD would be 0 
(50 minus 50) dollars. 
However, under the zeroing practice the DOC ignores 
(“zeros”) any negative PUDD before summing up.  Therefore, the 
total PUDD in this example is still 50 (50 plus 0) dollars, and the 
weighted-average dumping margin, which is total PUDD/total 
value of U.S. sales, is 25% (50/(50+150)).  In sum, the dumping 
margin is inflated by 25% in this hypothetical case on account of 
zeroing because it would have been 0% ((50-50)/(50+150)) without 
zeroing.  This zeroing practice under the ordinary (weighted 
average-to-weighted average) comparison method is called “model 
zeroing.”37  In the administrative review, as in an ordinary 
investigation process, any negative individual dumping margins 
(such as weighted average normal value minus individual export 
prices) are zeroed, which is called “simple zeroing.”38 
2.2. The Ancien Régime: The Old GATT Jurisprudence on Zeroing39 
In EC—Audio Cassettes (1995), Japan complained that the EC’s 
zeroing practice led to arbitrary results in the calculation of 
dumping margins since the practice tended to inflate dumping 
margins vis-à-vis the normal averaging (non-zeroing) 
methodology.40  Japan therefore argued that such methodology 
violated Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 6) of the Tokyo Round 
Antidumping Code, requiring “fair comparison,”41 as well as 
Article 8 (paragraph 3), stipulating that the amount of anti-
dumping duties should not exceed the actual dumping margin.42  
However, the EC responded that Article 2 concerned only those 
 
37 Panel Report, United States—Laws, Regulations, and Methodology for 
Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 2.3, WT/DS294/R (Oct. 31, 2005). 
38 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
39 Unlike the WTO, under the old GATT system any party, including a losing 
party, could “veto” the adoption of a panel report so that the report would not be 
legally “binding.”  However, even such an unadopted report was still regarded as 
a useful legal guidance.  See, e.g., Shochu II, supra note 7. 
40 EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 115. 
41 The same rule now appears in Article 2 (paragraphs 1 and 4) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement.  AD Agreement, supra note 9. 
42 The same rule now appears in Article 9 (paragraph 3) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement.  AD Agreement, supra note 9. 
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circumstances in which normal prices exceed export prices and did 
not cover the opposite situation where export prices exceed normal 
prices.43  While Japan accentuated the unfairness of zeroing by 
highlighting the eventual consequences of zeroing, the EC simply 
adopted the narrow textualist reading of Articles 2 and 8 from 
which it attempted to legitimize the zeroing methodology. 
The panel sided with the EC in its decision, which was 
reminiscent of the Lotus doctrine.44  The panel opined that nothing 
in Article 2 prevented the EC from adopting other calculative 
methodologies than normal averaging.45  Therefore, an anti-
dumping authority would not need to consider any negative 
dumping margins because it would obtain a separate dumping 
margin from each comparison between a price of a particular 
transaction in the home market (a normal value) and a price of yet 
another particular transaction in the export market (an export 
price).  Whenever an export price exceeds a home price, such a 
negative margin instantaneously becomes a zero margin under this 
single transaction framework.46 
Under the panel’s approach, anti-dumping authorities would 
enjoy an option not to “aggregate” multiple results of multiple 
individual comparisons between home and export transactions.  
Such option tends to render fortuitous, and thus insignificant, the 
eventuality of final dumping margins being exaggerated.  Here, the 
panel ignored the general necessity of aggregating multiple results 
of comparison in any comparison methodology.  It assumed, 
wrongly, that the necessity of aggregation would occur only under 
an average-to-average comparison methodology.  Therefore, the 
panel rejected Japan’s argument for the aggregation by opining 
that Article 2 would not require anti-dumping authorities to use 
exclusively the average-to-average comparison methodology.47 
The panel report was not adopted, reflecting the high political 
profile that it engendered.  Subsequently, despite intense 
 
43 EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 119. 
44  S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 19 (Sept. 7). 
45 EC —Cassettes, supra note 8, at ¶ 350. 
46 Id. ¶ 356 (“[I]f the existence and extent of dumping and the imposition of 
duties had been conducted on a transaction-to-transaction basis, the EC would 
have been entitled to impose a duty with respect to dumped transactions, where 
injury existed, irrespective of the prices at which other undumped transactions 
occurred.”). 
47 Id. ¶ 358. 
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negotiations under the Uruguay Round, WTO members failed to 
provide clear rules on zeroing.48  As a result, this controversial 
practice had been quite prevalent among the main users of anti-
dumping remedies, such as the U.S. and the EU, when India 
challenged the practice for the first time under the WTO system.49 
2.3. The Making of the Revolution: The Anti-Zeroing Jurisprudence in 
the WTO 
2.3.1. The Genesis 
2.3.1.1. EC—Bed Linen (2001) 
Echoing EC—Audio Cassettes, the EC clung to strict textualism 
and argued that Article 2 (Determination of Dumping) of the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement rendered no guide on how to combine 
individual dumping margins for specific product types to calculate 
an overall rate of dumping margin for the product under 
investigation.50  The EC held that a “dumping margin” under the 
Agreement could be established “for each product type or for each 
individual transaction” as well as for the product as a whole.51  It is 
not difficult to read between the lines of the EC position.  To 
implement the zeroing methodology, one should logically 
recognize each transaction as a separable segment (an individual 
transaction or a sub-product category) of the product under 
investigation.  Only in this way can one avoid including negative 
individual dumping margins in the calculation of an overall 
dumping margin for the product as a whole.  In other words, this 
fragmentation of a product into autonomous transactional units 
prevents any negative results in one sub-product (transaction) 
category from offsetting any positive results in other sub-product 
categories. 
 
48 Terence P. Stewart, Antidumping, in 2 THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A 
NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986–1992) 1383, 1540 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993).  
49 See John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law 
Legislation?, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 113, 118 (2003) (observing that zeroing has been a 
common practice in the anti-dumping community). 
50 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on 
Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India, ¶ 11, WT/DS141/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 
2001). [hereinafter EC —Bed Linen]. 
51 Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis in original). 
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However, in a surprising turn from the old GATT 
jurisprudence the AB rejected the EC position.  It ruled that the 
dumping margin should be established “for the product—cotton-
type bed linen—and not for the various types or models of that 
product.”52  The EC should have “compare[d] the weighted average 
normal value with the weighted average of prices of all comparable 
export transactions,” which include those transactions with negative 
individual dumping margins.53  Therefore, the EC failed to take into 
account these transactions by zeroing the minus dumping margins.54  
The AB invoked a general obligation of “fair comparison” under 
Article 2 as it implied that the zeroing methodology would entail 
unfair results.55  This is exactly what Japan had presented in EC—
Audio Cassettes.  Japan’s position, which had been rejected by a 
GATT panel in 1995, was finally vindicated by the AB.  This is the 
very first AB decision which struck down the zeroing practice.  Yet it 
was just the beginning of the WTO anti-zeroing jurisprudence. 
2.3.1.2. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (2004) 
The AB in this case reaffirmed the case law established in EC—
Bed Linen which defined dumping in terms of a “product . . . as a 
whole,” not narrowly for “a product type, model, or category of 
that product.”56  The AB rejected the U.S. zeroing methodology by 
denying its calculative selectiveness embedded in zeroing.  In its 
view, “the results of the multiple comparisons at the sub-group 
level” are “only intermediate calculations,” not the dumping 
margin for the purpose of the WTO Antidumping Code.57  The 
logical conclusion is that an anti-dumping authority should 
“aggregate” all of these intermediate calculations regardless of 
being plus or minus.58  Because zeroing basically cherry-picks only 
 
52 Id. ¶ 53 (emphasis in original). 
53 Id. ¶ 55. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. ¶ 59. 
56 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶¶ 95-96, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004), 
[hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber]. 
57 Id. ¶ 97. 
58 Id. Those who do not recognize this essential principle of “aggregation” 
argue that the negation of zeroing would be tantamount to a situation in which “a 
driver should not be found guilty of speeding if, along other portions of the road, 
he was driving under the speed limit.” Alford, supra note 23, at 208 (quoting 
Stewart, supra note 48, at 1540).  Yet this is a flawed analogy.  Any individual 
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positive results of these intermediate calculations in the situation of 
multiple comparisons and disregards (zeroes) negative ones, it 
does “not take into account the entirety of the prices of some export 
transactions” and thus “inflates the margin of dumping for the 
product as a whole.”59 
2.3.2. The Expansion 
2.3.2.1. U.S. – Zeroing (EC) (2006) 
Mirroring the EC’s earlier position in the EC—Bed Linen, the 
United States argued that the dumping margin “can be interpreted 
as applying on a transaction-specific basis.”60  However, in line 
with the previous case law in EC—Bed Linen and U.S.—Softwood 
Lumber V, the AB rejected this argument by reconfirming that the 
dumping margin should be established “for each known exporter 
or producer concerned of the product under investigation,” as 
stipulated in Article 6.10 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.61  
The AB viewed that such interpretation would be consistent with 
the goal of an anti-dumping regime which is “designed to 
counteract the foreign producer’s or exporter’s pricing 
behaviour.”62 
In particular, the AB ruled that zeroing was also illegal in the 
“administrative review” process, in addition to the original 
investigation process.  Administrative review processes occur 
upon request by interested parties.  The process is carried out by 
an antidumping authority (“DOC”), which performs an annual 
calculation of antidumping duties owed by each importer by 
comparing the price of each export transaction with a monthly 
average nominal value.63  The DOC then aggregates the results of 
 
incidence of speed-driving is an independent infringement, while an individual 
computation outcome between normal value and export price in a single 
transaction is mere an intermediate step to reaching a dumping margin.  A 
dumping margin presupposes a process of combination or aggregation if there are 
multiple transactions under investigations. 
59 U.S. – Softwood Lumber, at ¶¶ 98, 101 (emphasis in original). 
60 Appellate Body Report, United States—Laws, Regulations, and Methodology 
for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶128, WT/DS294/AB/R (May 14, 
2006) [hereinafter U.S. – Zeroing (EC)]. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. ¶ 129. 
63 Id. ¶ 109. 
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these comparisons and calculates the rate for each importer as a 
percentage of her total imports in the United States.64  The AB 
opined that the DOC’s “systematic” disregard of negative 
individual dumping margins before aggregating these individual 
dumping margins resulted in an increased rate of dumping for the 
importer.  The AB ruled that such systematic disregard violated 
Article 9.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and GATT Article 
VI:2, both of which stipulate that an anti-dumping duty shall not 
exceed a dumping margin. 
The AB based its decision strictly on textual grounds and 
justified it from the standpoint of “customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law” under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of the Treaties.65  The AB possibly wanted 
to deflect the potential criticism of judicial activism in relation to 
Article 17.6(ii) through this ostensibly literal interpretation.  
Rejecting zeroing through pure construction would have engulfed 
the AB with heavier attacks than it has invited under the current 
interpretation. 
Interestingly, the AB opened a window for future “as such” 
complaints against zeroing by endorsing the panel’s finding that 
zeroing “does have general and prospective application.”66 
2.3.2.2. U.S. – Softwood Lumber V (Article 21.5 – Canada) 
(2006) 
The United States challenged the AB’s emphasis on “multiple 
comparisons” on which the AB based its prohibition of zeroing.  
The United States argued that the AB’s position would render 
“illusionary” the United States “right to choose” different methods 
in calculating dumping margins.67  According to the United States, 
WTO members can elect not to aggregate multiple comparisons.  In 
particular, the United States plausibly argued under Article 2.4.2 of 
the WTO Antidumping Agreement that the AB’s “product as a 
whole” approach in the previous cases would not make sense in a 
“targeted dumping” scenario under the Article (a “pattern of 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. ¶ 134. 
66 Id. ¶ 204 (emphasis added). 
67 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada:  Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 34,  
WT/DS264/AB/RW (Aug. 15, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. – Softwood Lumber (Article 
21.5)]. 
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export prices which differ significantly among different 
purchasers, regions or time periods”) because two different 
dumping margins would occur for the same product, that is, “one 
margin of dumping for transactions falling within the specified 
pricing pattern and another for all other transactions.”68  Moreover, 
without zeroing, Article 2.4.2 would be meaningless since two 
different methodologies—i.e., the “weighted average-to-
transaction comparison” for a targeted dumping, and the 
“weighted average-to-weighted average comparison” for normal 
scenarios—would produce “mathematically equivalent” results.69 
However, the AB blatantly dismissed the United States’ 
arguments.  It viewed them as a “non-tested hypothesis” since the 
United States “has never applied” the weighted average-to-
transaction methodology under the second sentence of the Article 
(targeted dumping), “nor has it provided examples of how other 
WTO Members have applied this methodology.”70  In addition, 
according to the AB the “mathematically equivalen[t]” outcome 
would be at best “limited to a specific set of circumstances.”71 
Having condemned the zeroing practice under the 
aforementioned hypothetical scenario (the weighted average-to-
transaction comparison in a targeted dumping), the AB further 
moved to strike down zeroing in yet another comparison 
methodology under Article 2.4, namely, a “transaction-to-
transaction” comparison for the same reasons on which it based its 
previous rulings as to zeroing.  It held that “the use of zeroing 
under the transaction-to-transaction comparison methodology is 
difficult to reconcile with the notions of impartiality, even-
handedness, and lack of bias reflected in the ‘fair comparison’ 
requirement in Article 2.4” because it “distorts” certain export 
transactions (in that they are eventually zeroed) and consequently 
inflates dumping margins.72 
 
68 Id. ¶ 36. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. ¶ 97. 
71 Id. ¶ 99. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 138-40.  Furthermore, the AB noted that the unfair effects of zeroing 
tend to be more serious in the transaction-to-transaction comparison than in the 
weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparison because in the latter situation 
zeroing is performed after individual transactions were grouped and averaged, 
while in the former situation “excludes ab initio the results of all the comparisons 
in which the export prices are above normal value.”  Id. ¶ 141. 
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2.3.3. The Solidification 
2.3.3.1. U.S. – Zeroing (Japan) (2007) 
The AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence reached its climax in this 
case.  The decision, which was dubbed the “death knell of 
zeroing,”73 has thus far been the most sweeping and unyielding 
zeroing decisions in the WTO.  The AB struck down the U.S. use of 
the zeroing methodology as such in a transaction-to-transaction 
(“T-T”) comparison as well as in a weighted average-to-transaction 
(“W-T”) comparison.  It also illegalized zeroing under three types 
of administrative review (periodic review, new shipper review, 
and sunset review) both as such and as applied.  The United States 
repeated its previous defense that the zeroing issue must be 
addressed “separately for each comparison methodology and for 
each type of anti-dumping proceeding”74 so that an anti-dumping 
authority can enjoy the maximum discretion in its methodological 
choice among different types of comparisons.75 
Markedly, in addition to its previously seen recourse to textual 
grounds76 and practical damages to exporters due to the inflation 
of dumping rates,77 the AB rejected the U.S. argument from a 
rather teleological standpoint, taking into account one of the most 
paramount values of the global trading system, certainty and 
predictability.  It held that: 
126.  If it is permissible to determine a separate margin of 
dumping for each transaction, the consequence would be 
that several margins of dumping could be found to exist for 
each known exporter or foreign producer.  The larger the 
number of export transactions, the greater the number of 
such transaction-specific margins of dumping for each 
exporter or foreign producer.  This would create uncertainty 
and divergences in determinations to be made in original 
 
73 Daniel Pruzin, Dumping:  Latest WTO Ruling May Spell End of U.S. Use of 
Zeroing Methodology, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 83, 83 (2007) (quoting Brendan 
McGivern). 
74 Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews, ¶ 87, WT/DS322/AB/R (Jan. 9, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. —Zeroing 
(Japan)]. 
75 Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. 
76 Id. ¶ 115. 
77 Id. ¶ 123. 
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investigations and subsequent stages of anti-dumping 
proceedings.78 
As the culmination of a series of anti-zeroing decisions for the 
last several years, this ruling’s disciplinary range is quite broad, 
covering nearly all comparison methodologies not only in the 
original investigation but also in the different administrative 
review procedures.  This ruling seems to have delivered a clear 
message to the global trading community that the era of zeroing is 
gone. 
2.3.3.2 U.S. —Zeroing (Mexico) (2008) 
In a shocking move, the panel in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) 
explicitly defied the AB’s established anti-zeroing position and 
instead reverted to the findings of panels in U.S.—Zeroing (EC) and 
U.S.—Zeroing (Japan) which had upheld the “simple zeroing” in the 
administrative (periodic) review.79  The panel in U.S.—Zeroing 
(Mexico) emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking, bound 
by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that have addressed 
the same issue.”80  Interestingly, it found support for its position in 
Article 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) 
which prohibits the panel and the AB from adding to or 
diminishing WTO members’ rights and obligations.81  It also 
claimed that its reversal of the AB’s position in this issue was in 
pursuit of its obligation of an “objective examination” under 
Article 11 of the DSU. 
The AB, as had widely been predicted, reversed the panel’s 
findings on the United States’ simple zeroing practice and 
invalidated this methodology both “as such” and “as applied.”82  
 
78 Id. ¶ 126 (emphasis added). 
79 Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel 
from Mexico, ¶¶ 7.106, 7.115, WT/DS344/R, (Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Panel 
Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)].  A “simple zeroing” refers to the zeroing practice 
adopted under W-T or T-T comparisons between export price and normal value.  
The simple zeroing is often conducted in the administrative (periodic) review, 
which starts after a year from the publication of antidumping duties.  In contrast, 
the zeroing practice under weighted-average-to-weighted-average comparisons is 
called a “model zeroing.” 
80 Id. ¶ 7.102. 
81 Id. 
82 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶¶ 133, 129, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 2008) 
[hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)]. 
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The AB rejected the panel’s premise that there can be multiple 
dumping margins, and emphasized that dumping (and dumping 
margin) is an export-specific concept which should be defined in 
terms of a product as a whole, based on the textual interpretation of 
GATT Articles VI:1, VI:2 and VI:6(a) as well as WTO Anti-
Dumping Code Articles 2.1, 2.3, 3.4, and 5.1.83  The AB also justified 
its position by the “context” found in various other related 
provisions of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, such as Articles 
5.2(ii), 5.8, 6.1.1, 6.7, 6.10, 8.1, 8.2, 9.4, 9.5 and 11.84  Interestingly, 
the AB confirmed that both French and Spanish versions of Article 
6.10 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Code represent one single 
dumping margin (“une marge” and “el margen,” respectively).85  
Finally, the AB expressed its deep concern over the panel’s 
rebellious behavior.86 
2.3.3.3. U.S.—Continued Zeroing (2009) 
In this decision, the AB delivered a coup de grâce to the zeroing 
methodology in its entirety.  Regarding the “continued use of the 
zeroing methodology in successive proceedings” as measures, the 
AB sent an unequivocal signal that the simple zeroing, which the 
United States had continued to use in the periodic and subsequent 
reviews in defiance of the previous AB decisions, was illegal.87  The 
AB’s position was particularly definite in that it captured even the 
aforementioned “ongoing conduct” as a reviewable measure.88  In 
a rare Concurring Opinion, a member of the AB warned future 
panels not to further disobey the AB’s anti-zeroing jurisprudence 
by relying on rulings of the previous defiant panels (“pick[ing] 
over the entrails of battles past”).89 
In a similar tenor, the AB ruled firmly against the United 
States’ recurring claim that the panel violated the standard of 
review under Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement.  The 
AB’s hermeneutics was basically teleological in this ruling.  The AB 
 
83 Id. ¶¶ 83–86. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 87–93. 
85 Id. ¶ 88 n.200. 
86 Id. ¶ 162. 
87 Appellate Body Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of 
Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 185, WT/DS350/AB/R (Feb. 4, 2009) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter AB Report, U.S.—Continued Zeroing]. 
88 Id. ¶ 181. 
89 Id. ¶ 312. 
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rejected the AB’s self-serving construction of the term 
“permissible” by highlighting that “multiple meanings of a word 
or term [do not] automatically constitute ‘permissible’ 
interpretations within the meaning of Article 17.6(ii).”90  For the 
purpose of a “harmonious and coherent” interpretation, the AB 
prioritized the first sentence of Article 17.6(ii), which provides the 
law of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, over the second sentence, which endorses 
“permissible” interpretations.91  Under the AB’s “holistic” 
interpretation, the first sentence informs the second one, not vice 
versa.92  In other words, the critical role of “object and purpose” of 
a treaty in clarifying textual ambiguities, which is enshrined in the 
first sentence, should eventually “narrow the range of 
interpretations” under the second sentence.93 
3. INTERPRETING THE REVOLUTION:  TOWARD GLOBAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 
3.1. Putting the Zeroing Jurisprudence in Constitutional Perspective 
3.1.1. Constitutional Adjudication as Constitutional Lawmaking 
Capturing the constitutionality of the WTO’s new 
jurisprudence on zeroing involves “a dialogue of imagination and 
possibility” in that it produces a new way (theory) of observing 
this particular reality (zeroing).94  It is a daunting challenge since 
the terminology (constitution) is innately elusive and resistant to 
any fixed meaning.95  A recently emerging wide spectrum of 
narratives on trade constitution96 appears both useful and 
 
90 Id. ¶ 268. 
91 Id. ¶¶ 268–272. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. ¶ 273. 
94 Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 623, 645 
(2006) [hereinafter Trachtman, Constitutions]. 
95 Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: 
Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International 
Trade, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39, 40–41 (2001) (observing difficulties in defining 
constitutionalism in the WTO context). 
96 For example, Jeffrey Dunoff offered three (institutional, normative and 
judicial) lenses through which one could capture trade constitution.  Dunoff 
located an “institutional” lens in John Jackson’s classical framework of the 
multilateral trading system (GATT/WTO) under which a constitutional 
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distracting.  While these narratives may provide us with helpful 
cognitive frameworks by which we can re-formulate the AB’s 
zeroing rulings on a more solid ground, various taxonomies and 
perspectives which attempt to define trade constitution on their 
own terms often complicate a coherent understanding of this tricky 
notion.  Nonetheless, certain critical elements, such as the subject 
matter, the function of adjudication, and the milieu, combined tend 
to characterize the nature of constitutionalism or constitutionality 
within the WTO for the purpose of this Article. 
First, constitutional adjudication basically addresses the 
“governance” issue.  As it is related to the WTO’s telos of anti-
protectionism, constitutional adjudication “enable[s] its members 
to pursue common goals without being defeated by competing 
antisocial conduct of members of the group.”97  In other words, it 
aims to discipline parochial protectionism which undermines the 
multilateral trading system, i.e., legal disciplines over protectionist 
politics.98  Therefore, the purpose of constitutional adjudication 
goes beyond a mere settling of a bilateral trade dispute before the 
WTO court:  it aims to establish a general rule which other WTO 
members, not just parties concerned, will also observe in the 
future. 
Second, constitutional adjudication concerns the WTO court’s 
(the AB’s) deliberate departure from the conventional role of a 
 
transformation from a “power-oriented” regime to a “rule-oriented” system 
occurred through a development (evolution) of institution, i.e., the “structure and 
machinery” of an organization.  Dunoff also discovered a “normative” lens in 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann’s thesis which views the WTO’s constitutionalism as pre-
commitments on fundamental values, such as market freedom or non-
discrimination.  According to Petersmann, WTO constitutionalism effectively 
disciplines national policies “which tend to limit economic freedom to domestic 
citizens and, for centuries, have discriminated against foreign goods, foreign 
services and foreign consumers.”  Finally, Dunoff unearthed a “judicial” (or 
“jurisprudential”) lens of trade constitution in Deborah Cass’ thesis which focuses 
on certain constitutional principles which the WTO tribunal has increasingly 
invoked in shaping its decisions.  Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The 
WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 647, 
651–56 (2006). 
97 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 788 (1969) 
[hereinafter JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT]. 
98 See Dunoff, supra note 96, at 649 (“[W]e can understand the turn to 
constitutionalism as a mechanism for withdrawing controversial and potentially 
destabilizing issues from the parry and thrust of ordinary politics.”); see also 
Antonio F. Perez, WTO and U.N. Law:  Institutional Comity in National Security, 23 
YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 316–24 (1998) (discussing Professor Jackson’s constitutional 
view of international trade law). 
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triadic arbiter whose main mission is “neutral rule applier.”99  It 
self-licenses to engage in “creative forms of judicial law-making” 
in order to “giv[e] effect to the trade regime’s primary purpose.”100  
In this regard, Deborah Cass argues that the AB has adopted a 
unique interpretive technique (“constitutional doctrine 
amalgamation”) which borrows from other constitutional domains 
certain general, interstitial constitutional principles, such as rule of 
reason or proportionality.101  Therefore, constitutional adjudication 
eventually associates itself with broader and deeper issues, such as 
“how to design a fair system of law.”102 
Finally, a certain set of developments fashioning the 
environment of the AB’s critical adjudication may help illustrate an 
institutional self of the WTO.  Topical controversies and debates 
over the AB’s adjudication offer rich narratives in the WTO which 
attempt to “constitute,” on their own terms, desirable institutional 
paradigms re-configuring the subtle power allocation between the 
WTO and its members.  In sum, a proper constellation of 
interrelated factors, such as the AB’s hermeneutical shift, a 
legislative proposal to codify the shift, and a counter-proposal to 
reverse the shift, tends to provide a unique constitutional moment 
within the WTO which facilitates the advent of constitutional 
adjudication. 
Admittedly, the very invocation of “constitution” in the WTO 
context itself may be provoking.103  After all, the WTO has “no 
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, [and] no 
constitutional drafting process.”104  Nonetheless, any direct, un-
nuanced domestic analogy derived from the image of the 
Constitution may be ill-suited in the WTO context.  Despite social 
contexts and institutional paraphernalia that are different from 
those of states, the WTO may still retain certain “constitutional 
 
99 Cf. JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 492 
(2005) (noting that the WTO panels and Appellate Body aid their decision making 
by applying the rules and canons of treaty interpretation used by other 
international tribunals). 
100 Id. 
101 Cass, supra note 95, at 51, 67. 
102 Id. at 52. 
103 See id. at 40 (“In public lectures, John Jackson recalls the time when his use 
of the term among trade policy officials caused some consternation and 
criticism.”) (citing John H. Jackson, Lecture, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Boston, Nov. 3, 1999). 
104 Dunoff, supra note 96, at 650. 
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features” to the extent that governance or power allocation 
between the WTO and its members still matters.105  In other words, 
the WTO’s institutional arrangement, being different from that of 
states, should not thwart otherwise useful constitutional 
imaginations within the context of the WTO. 
In this regard, constitutional discourse in international trade 
law should involve various dynamic and flexible developments 
which may “proceed along a number of dimensions, and in a 
number of different institutional settings,” rather than “advance a 
particular constitutional structure or agenda.”106  This “plasticity” 
of trade constitution enables WTO Members to willingly respond 
to certain constitutional moments with adequate institutional 
changes.107  In this line, one possible dimension of trade 
constitution, inter alia, which this article concerns, may be defined 
as “a legal and judicial constitution that provides rules . . . for 
determining supremacy and the scope of judicial application of 
rules.”108 
3.1.2. Why Global Constitutional Lawmaking in the WTO? 
On the surface, the AB’s hermeneutical shift in zeroing does 
not appear inevitable.  The AB could still have been faithful to the 
literal ambiguities of the Antidumping Agreement as to zeroing 
and thus endorsed it under Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping 
Agreement in the same fashion followed by the 1995 GATT panel.  
Here, the role of the AB would have been an ordinary settler of 
trade disputes and there would have been nothing peculiar.  
Furthermore, the hermeneutical shift as it happened might have 
been deemed unspectacular as well: it might just have been yet 
another change of interpretation.  While it is true that the AB 
employed a teleological interpretation to overcome a possible 
textual interpretation that might have validated zeroing under 
Article 17.6(ii),109 such a teleological shift itself does not necessarily 
 
105 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note 94, at 625; cf. Joseph H. H. Weiler, The 
Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External 
Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 177, 189 n.38 (2002) 
(observing that the Appellate Body has a “constitutional” nature or dimension in 
that it interprets a “constituent document”). 
106 Trachtman, Constitutions, supra note 94, at 645 (emphasis added). 
107 Id. at 645. 
108 Id. at 624. 
109 Regarding the AB’s refusal to publicly announce that it conducted 
teleological interpretation, see Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple International 
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deserve the label of “constitutional” adjudication.  After all, neither 
all interpretive changes nor all teleological interpretations should 
necessarily be constitutional.  However, it is not the interpretive 
shift itself but the nature of the shift that should draw our attention 
to this issue.  Both the subject matter (zeroing) and its unique 
topicality tend to define the unique, constitutional quality of the 
AB’s hermeneutical shift. 
Crucially, one cannot fully capture the significance of AB’s 
hermeneutical turn without taking into account the current 
developments in anti-dumping measures and implications zeroing 
has for those developments.  Since the launch of the WTO in 1995, 
members have thus far initiated about 3,427 anti-dumping 
investigations, while GATT contracting parties conducted only 
1,600 investigations by the 1980s.110  What is more problematic is 
that while developed countries such as the United States and EU 
nations were historically the primary users of anti-dumping 
measures in the past, developing countries have recently begun to 
seek recourse in these trade remedies on a frequent basis.111  In 
 
Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law or Its 
Fragmentation, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 952 (2004) (“In considering the relationship 
between WTO Agreements and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), 
one must recognize that decisions of the panels or Appellate Body of the WTO do 
not make pronouncements in a direct fashion.”).  In the same context, the AB 
refused to acknowledge its teleological hermeneutical shift from permitting 
zeroing to abandoning it.  Instead, it simply disconnected from the old GATT 
jurisprudence in this matter based on narrow, formalistic, textual differences 
between the Tokyo Round Antidumping Code and the current WTO 
Antidumping Code, and thus eliminated any need to disclose the teleological root 
of its anti-zeroing decision.  See Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Anti-
dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, ¶ 132, WT/DS344/AB/R (Apr. 30, 
2008) (“[T]he relevance of these panel reports [under the Tokyo Round Anti-
Dumping Code] is diminished by the fact that the plurilateral Tokyo Round Anti-
Dumping Code was legally separate from the GATT 1947 and has, in any event, 
been terminated.”).  Nonetheless, one could reasonably submit that panel reports 
under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code constitute the GATT acquis.  See 
Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas—Complaint by the United States, ¶ 7.26, WT/DS27/R/USA, 
(May 22, 1997) (upholding a certain practice of panels under the Tokyo Round 
Anti-Dumping Code); Appellate Body Report, Brazil—Measures Affecting 
Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997) ¶ 22 (supporting conclusions 
expressed by panels under the Tokyo Round Anti-Dumping Code). 
110 Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Secretariat Reports 
Increase in New Anti-Dumping Investigations (May 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres09_e/pr556_e.htm. 
111 See id. (noting that developing countries have been reporting a high 
number of initiations, including India and Brazil). 
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particular, this proliferation of anti-dumping measures is 
devastating to poor countries whose economic growth is critically 
linked to access to rich countries’ markets.  Even if the current, 
staggering Doha round trade talks were to live up to their 
sobriquet (“development round”) by generously allowing poor 
countries duty and quota-free market access, rich countries could 
always impose extra hidden tariffs on poor countries’ main 
exports, such as shoes, clothes, and catfish, in the name of 
remedying foreign producers’ alleged dumping practice.112  These 
anti-dumping measures tend to effectively neutralize any 
previously enhanced market access borne to poor countries based 
on their comparative advantages.113  At this juncture, it is worth 
reiterating the fact that zeroing facilitates the progress of these 
damaging events by inflating dumping margins up to around 
90%.114 
Against this alarming background, the AB has issued a series of 
zeroing decisions.  In a total of six decisions since 2001, the AB has 
rendered a coherent and unwavering line of jurisprudence that 
unequivocally rejects this problematic practice.  It is this 
 
112 See Sungjoon Cho, A Dual Catastrophe of Protectionism, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 315, 338–41 (2005) (describing the imposition of additional duties by the U.S. 
on Vietnamese catfish); Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative 
Barriers as an Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395, 400 (2007) 
(“Even if rich countries grant poor countries duty and quota-free market access in 
the Doha negotiation, the former can always impose prohibitively high tariffs on 
the latter’s clothing or shoes on the ground that the latter dump these products in 
the former’s markets.”). 
113 This developmentally fatal effect of rich countries’ anti-dumping 
measures is well corroborated by trade statistics.  For the last decade, the world’s 
richest countries’ anti-dumping measures have aimed primarily at low-income 
developing countries.  Since the launch of the WTO, the United States has 
initiated a total of 366 antidumping investigations, 215 of which have targeted 
low-income developing countries.  WTO AD Website, supra note 12.  The EU 
follows the United States in this regard.  During the same period, the EU initiated 
345 antidumping investigations in total, 237 of which were directed to low-income 
developing countries.  Unsurprisingly, most of these antidumping initiations have 
concentrated on primary commodities and labor-intensive manufacturing goods 
on which developing countries hold the main comparative advantages vis-à-vis 
developed countries.  If left unchecked, this developmentally fatal trend might 
endure as the share of manufacturing products in developing countries’ gross 
exports increases in the future.  World Bank, Global Economic Prospects:  Realizing 
the Development Promise of Doha Agenda 2004 (2003), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRGEP2004/Resources/gep2004fulltext 
.pdf (describing graphs that indicate that gross exports are steadily increasing and 
could continue to do so in the coming years). 
114 Ikenson, supra note 16. 
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resoluteness that distinguishes the AB’s teleological exegesis from 
an otherwise mere interpretive methodology.  Silhouetted against 
the aforementioned topicality of zeroing, the judicial rulemaking 
on zeroing was the AB’s purposeful mission of institutionalizing a 
“proper test”115 which would shrink the domestic government’s 
administrative discretion and thus render a pro-zeroing 
interpretation “impermissible” under Article 17.6(ii) in this 
particular anti-dumping issue.  In doing so, the AB activated a 
fundamental normative force field which would govern the 
behaviors of all members, not only those who were direct parties of 
the dispute, in a way that would herald a new policy in the zeroing 
field.  It is fundamental in the sense that zeroing undermines the 
very telos of the WTO (free trade) and defies the very identity of 
the WTO as a trade organization. 
This constitutional adjudication is inextricably linked to a 
string of developments that, in combination, may signify a certain 
“constitutional moment” in the WTO.  What the AB struck down in 
its first zeroing decision (EC—Bed Linen) in 2001 concerned only a 
specific type of zeroing (zeroing in a weighted-average-to-
weighted-average comparison).  However, a group of seventeen 
WTO members states collectively coined “Friends of Anti-
dumping,” seized this moment to propose the prohibition of 
zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003.116  
The Friends of Anti-dumping proposal was vindicated by the AB’s 
subsequent across-the-board invalidation of zeroing.117  However, 
the United States, the only defendant that has lost all zeroing cases, 
 
115 Cf. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 203–
04 (1985) (arguing that most of the U.S. Supreme Court’s efforts have been 
directed toward preliminary matters such as determining the proper test to apply 
to the case, rather than “actual resolution of cases at hand,” which “reflects and 
enhances a perspective that is regulatory, abstract, and adversarial”). 
116 Proposal on Prohibition of Zeroing, Paper from Brazil; Chile; Columbia; Costa 
Rica; Hong Kong, China; Israel; Japan; Korea; Mexico; Norway; the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Singapore; Switzerland and Thailand, 
TN/RL/W/113 (Jun. 6, 2003) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing Proposal]: 
Amend Article 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that regardless of the basis of 
the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e. weighted average-
to-weighted-average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted average-
to-transaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of 
dumping found on imports from an exporter or producer of the product 
subject to investigation or review must be added up. 
117 See supra Section 2.3.3. (establishing that there ought to be a prohibition on 
zeroing in the calculation of dumping margins). 
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proposed to reinstate the zeroing practice via amendment.118  On 
November 30, 2007, the Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules 
circulated the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreements,” which attempted to reach a compromise 
between the AB jurisprudence and the U.S. proposal, but 
dissatisfied both sides.119  In sum, those tensions and controversies 
engendered by the AB’s zeroing decisions are a testimonial to a 
constitutional moment as far as zeroing is concerned in that they, 
together with the AB’s constitutional adjudication, tend to shape 
the contours of an institutional identity of the WTO as an 
international organization that upholds free trade. 
The AB has presented a “constitutional question” and 
promulgated an answer in response to recent anti-zeroing 
decisions, i.e., how we should understand and construct the WTO 
in the face of members’ policy options which could potentially 
compromise the very goal of the organization.  Here, the AB chose 
a different interpretive path from the old GATT panel, thereby 
breathing a new life into the same old texts, such as “a fair 
comparison between the export price and the domestic price”120 
and “the amount of the anti-dumping duty must not exceed the 
margin of dumping.”121  This critical choice was based on the AB’s 
firm understanding of the immediate and powerful normative 
 
118 See Communication from the United States, United States—Laws, 
Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping Margins (“Zeroing”), ¶ 29, 
WT/DS294/16 [hereinafter The U.S. May 2006 Communication] (May 17, 2006) 
(explaining the United States’ proposal to reinstate the zeroing practice in 
opposition to the “Friends of Anti-dumping”); Proposal from the United States on 
Offsets for Non-Dumped Comparisons, TN/RL/GEN/147, Jun. 27, 2007 [hereinafter 
The U.S. June 2007 Proposal]. 
119 Negotiating Group on Rules, Draft Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and 
SCM Agreements, TN/RL/W/213 (Nov. 30, 2007) [hereinafter WTO AD Draft]. 
Regarding reactions to the Draft Texts, see the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Joint Statement by the Office of the United States Trade 
Representative and the Department of Commerce’s International Trade 
Administration, Nov. 30, 2007 (stating that the U.S. was “very disappointed with 
important aspects of this draft text”); WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Statement 
on “Zeroing” in the Anti-Dumping Negotiations, Statement of Brazil; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Israel; Japan; Korea, Rep. of; 
Mexico; Norway; Pakistan; Singapore; South Africa; Switzerland; Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; Thailand; and Vietnam, 
TN/RL/W/214/Rev.3 (Jan. 25, 2008) [hereinafter The Anti-Zeroing Statement] 
(emphasizing that zeroing as a “biased” method for calculating dumping margins 
risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade liberalization efforts.”) . 
120 AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 2.4. 
121 Id. at art. 9.3. 
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consequences that its adjudication would bring in the future WTO.  
To wit, the AB was well aware that its adjudication would 
“constitute” the WTO, at least as far as the zeroing issue is 
concerned.  This is why the nature of the AB’s hermeneutical shift 
on zeroing might be coined constitutional. 
One important caveat is in order: constitutional adjudication, 
which is theorized in this Article, is entirely subject matter-specific 
as it exclusively refers to the zeroing practice.  Therefore, the 
constitutional adjudication addressed here should not be unduly 
generalized and expanded to other WTO issues.  Importantly, 
constitutional adjudication on zeroing does not fossilize in general 
Article 17.6(ii), which may still provide ample deference to 
domestic antidumping authorities on other anti-dumping issues.  
Moreover, constitutional adjudication might not make sense in 
non-antidumping contexts; and even if it does, it could feature 
entirely different patterns from what is described in this context.  
For example, if the AB were to adjudicate another important 
regulatory issue of reconciling trade value and non-trade value 
(legitimate policy objectives), such as the protection of public 
health and the environment, its judicial rulemaking in these areas 
would be aptly characterized as different types of constitutional 
adjudication.122 
3.2. Normative Ramifications of Global Constitutional Lawmaking 
3.2.1. Could WTO Members Overturn Constitutional 
Lawmaking? 
After losing a series of zeroing cases under the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism, the United States proposed that zeroing be 
ultimately resolved through negotiations, instead of being left to 
adjudication.123  Naturally, the United States suggested that 
 
122 See generally SUNGJOON CHO, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL REGULATION: A 
REFORM AGENDA OF THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003) (noting that the AB has 
“decided on a case by basis whether a given domestic regulation was applied 
consistently or whether it respected due process, rather than reinvestigating . . . 
whether the substance of the regulation itself is necessary”). 
123 See Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped 
Comparisons, TN/RL/W/208 (Jun. 5, 2007) at 2 [hereinafter The U.S. June 2007 
Communication] (noting that the United States’ view of the “proper resolutions to 
the issue requires clear text providing that the margins of dumping may be 
determined without offsets for non-dumped transactions consistent with the long-
held concept of dumping”). 
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relevant provisions of the Antidumping Agreement, such as 
Articles 2.4 and 9.3, be amended in a way that explicitly endorses 
zeroing.124  The United States drive for negotiation prompted the 
Chair of the Negotiating Group on Rules, the Uruguayan 
Ambassador Guillermo Valles Games, to circulate on November 
30, 2007 the “Drafted Consolidated Chair Texts of the AD and SCM 
Agreements,” which “[he] believe[d] could facilitate the 
negotiation of a balanced outcome.”125 
The Chair’s draft text on zeroing appears to be a compromise 
between the current WTO case law and the U.S. proposal.  While 
the text prohibits zeroing in “multiple comparisons of a weighted 
average normal value with a weighted average of prices of all 
comparable export transactions,” it permits zeroing “on a 
transaction-to-transaction basis or of multiple comparisons of 
individual export transactions to a weighted average normal 
value” as well as in case of administrative reviews.126  A large 
group of countries opposing zeroing criticized the text.  They 
emphasized that zeroing is a “biased” method for calculating 
dumping margins risks “nullify[ing] the results of trade 
liberalization efforts.”127  The Chair subsequently conceded that 
there simply existed “no hints on possible middle ground 
approaches nor suggestions for possible compromises or trade-
offs.”128 
Considering these diametrically opposite views on zeroing 
among major WTO members as well as the inchoate stage of WTO 
negotiations regarding this controversial issue, any pro-zeroing 
amendment to the Antidumping Agreement is highly unlikely, at 
least in the near future.129  Nonetheless, if such an amendment 
 
124 The United States proposed adding the following paragraph: “Authorities 
are not required to offset the results of any comparison in which the export price 
is greater than the normal value against the results of any comparison in which 
the normal value is greater than the export price.” The United States May 2006 
Communication, supra note 118; The U.S. June 2007 Proposal, supra note 118. 
125 WTO AD Draft, supra note 119. 
126 Id. 
127 The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note 119. 
128 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Working Document from the Chairman, 
TN/RL/W/232, at 1, A-10, A-11 (May 28, 2008). 
129 See Jonathan Lynn, Anti-Dumping Row Roils WTO, Isolates U.S., REUTERS, 
Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1044224620080110 (quoting 
Brenden McGivern who observed that “it’s wildly optimistic of the U.S. to think 
they’ll get this back through negotiations”). 
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should ever transpire, would it trump the outcome of the AB’s 
constitutional adjudication (constitutional jurisprudence)? 
Purely from a normative standpoint, one might argue that it 
should not.  According to this position, since constitutional 
jurisprudence on zeroing directly addresses the most essential 
value (telos) of the WTO system, such as anti-protectionism, even 
an amendment of WTO norms should not repeal this fundamental 
norm.130  This preemptive, per se invalid position tends to 
distinguish constitutional jurisprudence from other WTO case law 
concerning more mundane trade disputes whose outcome may be 
altered by subsequent negotiations. 
However, this position appears not only infeasible but also 
illogical.  The existence of one constitutional norm (anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence) should not unduly block any future constitutional 
dynamics under the WTO.  One might logically envision a 
situation in which WTO members might need to modify, if not 
repeal, even this jurisprudence via a constitutional amendment, 
such as a revision of the WTO Charter and/or the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement.  Nevertheless, WTO members must not 
entertain any lax overriding of such paramount constitutional 
jurisprudence.  An example would be repealing the constitutional 
jurisprudence through a soft norm, such as a decision or a 
declaration by Ministers131 simply as a result of mundane 
bargaining in the trade negotiation, as is currently conducted in the 
Negotiating Group on Rules.132  This lower threshold in nullifying 
constitutional norms risks over-politicizing the WTO’s normative 
operation in this important area.133  In this sense, the legal status of 
 
130 See The Anti-Zeroing Statement, supra note 119 (observing that the 
countries involved in drafting this statement seek to reduce protectionism). 
131 See Mary E. Footer, The Role of ‘Soft’ Law Norms in Reconciling the 
Antinomies of WTO Law (July 14, 2008), SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW  
INAUGURAL CONFERENCE 12–13, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159929 
(observing that soft norms, such as a “decision,” are subject to a hardening process, 
such as an “amendment”).  According to Footer, it is conceivable that a decision 
remains unamended.  Id. 
132 Currently, most WTO members approach this issue not even through 
“negotiation” but rather merely as “discussion.”  Lamy Urges “Maximum Effort” for 
July Meeting of Ministers, WTO: 2008 NEWS ITEMS, Jun. 27, 2008, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_stat_june08_e.htm. 
133 Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, What’s Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in 
GREAT AND EXTRAORDINARY OCCASIONS: DEVELOPING GUIDELINES FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39 (1999) (warning that frequent constitutional 
amendments might be used as “a chip in short-run political games”). 
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anti-zeroing jurisprudence might be analogous to a strong version 
of the U.S. “constitutional common law,” which survives an 
ordinary legislative challenge yet is still subject to a subsequent 
constitutional amendment.134  In other words, procedural rigors 
built into Article X (Amendment) of the WTO Agreement, 
including a super majority rule,135 must govern any modification of 
the zeroing jurisprudence.  A simple decision or declaration 
engineered by a negotiation must not immediately overturn it 
without a formal amendment.  On the contrary, under an ideal 
scenario, WTO members should “codify” the outcome of 
constitutional adjudication, i.e., the AB’s anti-zeroing case law.136 
3.2.2. Could a Lower Tribunal (Panel) Reject Constitutional 
Lawmaking? 
Despite the well-established anti-zeroing jurisprudence, the 
recent panel in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) explicitly rejected the AB’s 
positions—in particular those in U.S.—Zeroing (EC) and U.S.—
 
134 A strong version of constitutional common law, which I analogize here, 
refers to certain constitutional rules that are “elaborated by judges through 
precedent-based reasoning” and “not defensible by ordinary legislation.”  See 
generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 877 (1996) (considering whether common law constitutional interpretation 
gives judges too much power and whether this is appropriate in a democracy).  
See also Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common 
Law at 1 n.2 (Chi. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 73).  In contrast, 
a soft version of constitutional common law envisions being overturned by 
legislation.  See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—
Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). 
135 See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. X, paras. 1 and 3 (“Amendments to 
provisions of this Agreement, or of the Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annexes 
1A and 1C, other than those listed in paragraphs 2 and 6, of a nature that would 
alter the rights and obligations of the Members, shall take effect for the Members 
that have accepted them upon acceptance by two thirds of the Members and 
thereafter for each other Member upon acceptance by it.”). 
136 A group of countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Hong 
Kong, China, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Separate Customs 
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, Singapore, Switzerland and 
Thailand, collectively called the “Friends of Antidumping,” proposed a 
prohibition of zeroing in all kinds of comparison methodologies in June 2003.  
They proposed an amendment of “[A]rticle 2.4.2 to explicitly provide that 
regardless of the basis of the comparison of export prices to normal value (i.e. 
weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction, or weighted 
average-to-transaction), all positive margins of dumping and negative margins of 
dumping found on imports from an exporter or producer of the product subject to 
investigation or review must be added up.”  The Anti-Zeroing Proposal, supra 
note 117. 
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Zeroing (Japan)—and instead followed the line of reasoning that 
two previous panels had employed in these cases.137  These cases 
concerned, inter alia, a “simple zeroing” in the administrative 
(periodic) review.138  Although the U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) panel 
admitted that the AB “de facto expects” the panel to respect 
adopted AB reports “to the extent that the legal issues are 
similar,”139 it emphasized that panels “are not, strictly speaking, 
bound by previous Appellate Body or panel decisions that have 
addressed the same issue.”140  However, as long as constitutional 
adjudication in this matter is presumed, the panel’s stance is 
unacceptable for the following reasons. 
First, the panel overstated the degree to which it is not bound 
by prior AB decisions.  No matter how one labels WTO 
jurisprudence, the label itself has never actually bestowed 
compliance pull upon those decisions.141  Regardless of the label, 
Members perceive these precedents as well-established 
“jurisprudence” which they voluntarily observe: they cite, quote 
and refer to the AB’s precedents to substantiate and reinforce their 
own legal positions in the dispute.  While not all Members abide 
by the WTO jurisprudence all the time, such breaches do not 
necessarily nullify the legal authority of the jurisprudence.  In 
particular—if such jurisprudence concerns constitutional issues, 
such as zeroing—its compliance pull tends to be stronger than it 
would be in other situations since Members fully appreciate the 
normative weight of such jurisprudence.  Perhaps this heightened 
compliance pull can explain the EC’s swift change of course the 
moment the AB struck down its own zeroing practice in 2001.142 
 
137 Panel Report, United States—Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel 
from Mexico, ¶ 7.106, WT/DS344/R (Dec. 20, 2007) (“[W]e have decided that we 
have no option but to respectfully disagree with the line of reasoning developed 
by the Appellate Body regarding the WTO-consistency of simple zeroing in 
periodic reviews.”) [hereinafter U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico)]. 
138 Id. ¶¶ 7.106, 7.115. 
139 Id. ¶ 7.105. 
140 Id. ¶ 7.102. 
141 Cf. Fabien Gélinas, Dispute Settlement as Institutionalization in International 
Trade and Information Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 493 (2005) (observing 
that precedential effect in the WTO does not originate strictly from “stare decisis” 
but rather from a concern for “formal justice,” a concept concerned with 
preserving the “security and predictability” of the multilateral trading system). 
142 See supra Section 2.3. 
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Second, as discussed above, constitutional adjudication on 
zeroing normatively prevails even over Members’ attempts to 
modify its outcome through political bargaining or amendment.  If 
constitutional adjudication should govern Members’ behavior, it 
should also regulate panels’ rulings.  Otherwise, the normative 
superiority flowing from constitutional adjudication would be 
meaningless. 
Third, the U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) panel rationalized its defiance 
by invoking DSU Article 19.2, which prohibits both the panel and 
the AB from “‘add[ing] to or diminish[ing]’” WTO Members’ 
rights and obligations.143  In other words, the panel implied that 
the AB diminished the United States’ rights under the WTO norms 
by judicially enacting a new proscription on zeroing.  However, the 
very idea of constitutional adjudication tends to prevent the panel 
from making such a self-assured determination.  A WTO panel, as 
a lower tribunal, is not entitled to question the validity of a 
constitutional decision rendered by the AB—a constitutional 
tribunal.  Moreover, the panel’s justification for departing from the 
AB’s constitutional jurisprudence is itself groundless: the AB’s 
constitutional adjudication never diminishes Members’ WTO 
rights and obligations; it simply “clarifies” them from the 
standpoint of a trade constitution. 
Sharing the same position, the AB in U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico) 
rightly rejected the panel’s position on this issue.  It emphasized 
that the fact that AB reports may not be “binding” per se does not 
free panels from observing previous reports.144  The AB reiterated 
its previous findings that adopted AB reports create “legitimate 
expectations” among WTO Members and that panels’ observance 
of those reports would also be expected.145  The AB justified its 
position with a critical observation on the value of “jurisprudence” 
within the WTO, which is arguably the most important dicta on 
this question. 
Adopted panel and Appellate Body reports are often cited 
by parties in support of legal arguments in dispute 
settlement proceedings, and are relied upon by panels and 
the Appellate Body in subsequent disputes.  In addition, 
 
143 U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 137, ¶ 7.102. 
144 Panel Report, U.S.—Zeroing (Mexico), supra note 79, ¶ 158. 
145 Id. (citing Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages II, at 14, 
WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)). 
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when enacting or modifying laws and national regulations 
pertaining to international trade matters, WTO Members 
take into account the legal interpretation of the covered 
agreements developed in adopted panel and Appellate 
Body reports.146 
The AB did not forget to admonish the panel’s unusual 
behavior.  With a solemn tone, it emphasized that the panel’s 
defiance is against the hierarchical division of labor in DSU under 
which only the AB can “uphold, modify or reverse” panels’ legal 
interpretations.147  The AB expressed its deep concern over the 
panel’s rebellious behavior.148 
In the most recent zeroing dispute (U.S.—Continued Zeroing), 
the panel did follow the AB’s well-established anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence, unlike previous panels, which had defied the AB.  
Yet the panel did so only reluctantly.  The panel still viewed those 
decisions by defiant panels as “persuasive,”149 although it 
eventually struck down the United States’ zeroing practices for the 
sake of WTO jurisprudence.150  In response, a rare concurring 
opinion tolled the eventual death knell for zeroing adjudication by 
declaring that: 
In matters of adjudication, there must be an end to every 
great debate.  The Appellate Body exists to clarify the 
meaning of the covered agreements.  On the question of 
zeroing it has spoken definitively.  Its decisions have been 
adopted by the DSB.  The membership of the WTO is 
entitled to rely upon these outcomes . . . .  At a point in 
every debate, there comes a time when it is more important 
for the system of dispute resolution to have a definitive 
outcome, than further to pick over the entrails of battles 
past.  With respect to zeroing, that time has come.151 
 
146 Id. ¶ 160. 
147 Id. ¶ 161. 
148 Id. ¶ 162. 
149 Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing 
Methodology, ¶ 251, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008). 
150 Id. ¶ 257. 
151 Id. ¶ 312. 
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4. RESISTANCE TO GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 
4.1. Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing 
The bold jurisprudence that the AB has crafted in striking 
down zeroing has invited a good deal of criticism on various 
fronts.  Some contend that nowhere in the WTO and its 
Antidumping Agreement texts or their legislative histories—the 
Uruguay Round negotiation history—does an explicit prohibition 
on this practice exist.  According to these critics, the AB is, 
therefore, “making up rules that the U.S. never negotiated.”152  
Likewise, the U.S. government has observed that: 
A prohibition of zeroing, or a requirement to provide 
offsets for non-dumped transactions, simply cannot be 
found in the text of the AD [Antidumping] Agreement . . . . 
The issue of zeroing, on which Members could not reach 
agreement in the Uruguay Round, should not be left to 
dispute settlement.  We as Members should endeavour [sic] 
to reach an agreement on this issue through negotiation.153 
In fact, Article 17.6 (ii) of the Antidumping Agreement 
provides that in times of ambiguities (when a provision “admits of 
more than one permissible interpretation”) a WTO panel shall 
validate a domestic anti-dumping authority’s measure “if it rests 
upon one of those permissible interpretations.”154  In light of this 
article, the AB’s invalidation of zeroing—which is not prohibited 
under GATT Article VI or the Antidumping Agreement—might be 
seen as “legislating to fill in the perceived gaps in the coverage of 
the Antidumping Agreement” and thus as violating the “standard 
of review contained in the Antidumping Agreement that calls for 
deference to national administrators of antidumping laws.”155 
 
152 News Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, U.S. Trade Laws and 
the WTO 3 (Sept. 27, 2002), http://finance.senate.gov/press/pr092702.pdf. 
153 Communication from the United States, Offsets for Non-Dumped 
Comparisons, 2, TN/RL/W/208 (June 5, 2007).  
154 AD Agreement, supra note 9, art. 17.6 (ii). 
155 Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
417, 421 (2001). See also Alford, supra note 23, at 199–202 (concluding “that the 
Appellate Body in U.S.—Zeroing circumvented the particularized standard of 
review required under the Antidumping Agreement”); Greenwald, supra note 49, 
at 114 (warning that “the promise of an effective international dispute settlement 
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The discontent over the AB’s judicial activism is largely 
focused on what some have termed “judicial legislation.”156  
Judicial legislation exercised by an overzealous trade tribunal 
would encroach upon member states’ regulatory autonomy in 
certain policy matters that they believe have never been ceded to 
international organizations like the WTO.  The way in which the 
DSU is written might attest to this position.  Under the DSU, the 
formal mission of the WTO tribunal is merely to assist the Dispute 
Settlement Body (i.e., the General Council) in settling disputes 
between WTO Members by delivering mere 
“recommendations.”157  As frequently understood, these 
recommendations are not permitted to add to or diminish the rights 
and obligations of member states.158 
Often, criticisms of the AB’s judicial activism become rather 
emotional.  Understandably, they originate from certain domestic 
producers who compete with foreign rivals.  They contend that 
“‘zeroing’ is one of the sinews of U.S. anti-dumping law [and that] 
the [a]bandonment of ‘zeroing’ would not be, as some have 
suggested, a methodological tweak of Commerce’s dumping 
methodology or a minor concession by the United States to mollify 
the WTO.”159 
The U.S. Congress has been quite responsive to these anxious 
voices.  In a recent statute renewing the President’s trade 
promotion authority (“TPA”), Congress explicitly demonstrated its 
frustration over the AB’s interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) of the 
 
system will never be realized if the WTO professionals are incapable of restraining 
their impulse to legislate under the guise of ‘neutral’ dispute settlement”). 
156 See Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, 
Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 247–48 (2004) 
(observing that a wide range of commentators, such as scholars, practitioners, 
politicians and NGOs have recently accused the WTO Appellate Body of judicial 
activism). 
157 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, art. 19.1, at 1237 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
158 Id. arts. 3.2, 19.2.  The U.S. May 2006 Communication, supra note 118 (“The 
perception that the dispute settlement system is operating so as to add to or 
diminish rights and obligations actually agreed to by Members, notwithstanding 
DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2, is highly corrosive to the credibility that the dispute 
settlement system has accumulated over the past 11 years.”). 
159 HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, JOINT STATEMENT OF AD HOC 
SHRIMP TRADE ACTION COMMITTEE AND SOUTHERN SHRIMP ALLIANCE, available at 
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=5468.   
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WTO Antidumping Agreement, alleging that it deprived the U.S. 
regulatory agency (the Commerce Department) of its rightful 
deference secured under the article.  The 2001 TPA Bill provides 
that “the Congress is concerned that dispute settlement panels of 
the WTO and the Appellate Body appropriately apply the standard 
of review contained in Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement, 
to provide deference to a permissible interpretation by a WTO 
member of provisions of that Agreement.”160  In December 2006 a 
group of ten U.S. senators with a similar intent sent a letter to the 
U.S. Trade Representative and the Commerce Department warning 
that the elimination of zeroing would lead to a “dramatic 
weakening of U.S. antidumping laws.”161  In light of these protests 
from Congress, some commentators warn that the AB’s disregard 
of the special standard of review might deter the United States’ 
generous trade concessions in the subsequent round of trade 
negotiations.162  According to them, the AB’s judicial activism 
might yield only a Pyrrhic victory for free-tradists.163 
4.2. Defending Constitutional Adjudication on Zeroing 
4.2.1. The Augmented Role of International Adjudication 
Despite the criticism of “judicial usurpation,”164 it is widely 
recognized that judges, both international and domestic, do more 
than merely apply rules in a mechanical fashion.  To some extent, 
judicial legislation is an innate, unavoidable function of 
 
160 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 §3801(b)(3)(B), 19 
U.S.C. §§3801–13 (2006). 
161 Rossella Brevetti, U.S. Zeroing Methodology Hit Again by WTO Appellate 
Body, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 52, 53 (2007). 
162 See Daniel K. Tarullo, Paved with Good Intentions: The Dynamic Effects of 
WTO Review of Anti-Dumping Action, 2 WORLD TRADE REV. 373, 374 (2003) (noting 
that the United States may adjust its negotiating strategy “to take account of this 
institutional usurpation of the [previous] negotiation results”); Steinberg, supra 
note 156, at 261 (claiming that the AB’s failure to give weight to members’ intent 
could risk “political repercussions”).  But see U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE 
(GAO), GAO-03-824, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
IMPACT OF TRADE REMEDY RULINGS (2003) (observing that “of the legal experts 
GAO consulted, a majority concluded that the WTO has properly applied 
standards of review and correctly ruled on major trade remedy issues”). 
163 Tarullo, supra note 162, at 374. 
164 See generally Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the 
Development of the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172 (1892) (defending judicial 
legislation against its “sense of reproach”). 
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adjudication.165  To deny this proposition would almost be akin to 
believing a myth.166  As early as the end of the nineteenth century, 
Ezra Thayer emphasized that the “growth of law” via judicial 
legislation is not only “desirable” but also “necessary.”167  Two 
decades later, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously ruled that 
when we interpret “constituent act[s],” such as the Constitution, 
we must be aware that “they have called into life a being the 
development of which could not have been foreseen completely by 
the most gifted of its begetters.”168  More recently, Martin Shapiro 
observed that it would be “logically required” that any judicial 
discovery involves judicial lawmaking since no pre-existing norm 
completely covers future cases.169  After all, any norms—if left 
unchanged—tend to become outmoded, and even anachronistic, as 
they fail to respond to altered realities with the passage of time. 
The necessity for judicial progressive development, or 
updating, of fixated text is no less acute in the international law 
arena than in the domestic legal system.  In fact, the need for 
judicial gap-filling may be stronger in the international law setting 
since deliberate ambiguities are often written into the text as 
necessary evils that allow unyielding state parties to reach a 
compromise.  These textual ambiguities unavoidably widen a gap 
between the black letter law (past) and the cases at hand (present).  
Thus, it becomes a vital mission of any (well-functioning) 
international tribunal to seek “consistency that connects past, 
present, and future.”170  This is the very reason why international 
judges, in interpreting treaty texts, “must have regard to the 
 
165 See Thomas M. Franck, Some Psychological Factors in International Third-
Party Decision-Making, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1217, 1220–21 (1967) (articulating the 
presumption of general bias in decision making, though not placing a value 
judgment on it).  See also Fabien Gélinas, Dispute Resolution as Institutionalization in 
International Trade and Information Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490 (2005) 
(observing a general trend of judicial legislation in the post-war era) (citing RAN 
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 1 (2004)). 
166 See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521 
(2005) (noting that “this ideal type [of non-legislating judge] accurately describes 
almost no actual domestic court in existence”). 
167 See Thayer, supra note 165, at 178–79. 
168 Missouri v. Holland, 253 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
169 MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 29 
(1981). 
170 THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 335 
(1995). 
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exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of 
those who framed it.”171  In this sense, international adjudication, 
even more than domestic, engages in a “dynamic” process of 
judicial rulemaking, which produces jurisprudence or case law.172  
The WTO tribunal is not an exception to this trend.173 
 
171 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the UN, 
1950 I.C.J. 4, 17–18 (Mar. 1950) (quoted in Alvarez, supra note 166, at 96). 
172 See Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT: Dispute Resolution and the 
Judicialization of the Trade Regime in LAW ABOVE NATIONS: SUPRANATIONAL COURTS 
AND THE LEGALIZATION OF POLITICS 118, 139 (Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997) (arguing 
that the Standing Appellate Body of the WTO engages not only in dispute 
resolution but also in  rulemaking and social control).  Cf. David A. Strauss, 
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 884 (1996) 
(discussing the “prevalence and importance of nontextual amendments”); HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT 155–226 (1958) (arguing that “judicial legislation” is particularly 
appropriate in the international sphere, and entirely “healthy and unavoidable”); 
EDWARD MCWHINNEY, SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 168 (1986) (discussing 
the “imperative principles” of a novel jus gentium); RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1985) (arguing that independent judges in international 
trade tribunals can develop a jus gentium free from the contingencies of the 
various states). See also Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States 
Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L. 
REV. 899, 937 (2005) (recognizing the inevitability of gap-filling and certain 
“minimal lawmaking” by independent international tribunals).  Cf. Edward T. 
Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1492, 
1510 (2004) (observing many scholars’ view that the “power of international 
institutions to interpret their founding instruments is a significant source of 
authority for generating new rules”). 
173 See Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law (Part 
One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845, 848–49 (1999) (recognizing the WTO 
tribunal’s rule-making role).  Joel Trachtman espouses the case of judicial rule-
making in the WTO dispute settlement system because he employs the 
“rules/standards” distinction and the economic approach of an “incomplete 
contract.”  Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note 22, at 350–55.  He argues 
that the WTO tribunal is “not simply a mechanism for neutral application of 
legislated rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance.” Id. at 
336.  In a similar context, Kenneth Abbott views “legalization” as “delegation,” 
meaning that third parties are authorized to interpret and apply those rules as 
well as to resolve disputes.  Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, in 
LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 17 (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).  After 
all, it may be optimal if an originally incomplete contract—such as the WTO 
treaty—which contains not only definite rules but also more open-ended standards, 
may be filled in later by a judicial organ.  See also Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the 
Value of Vagueness: An Economic Perspective on Precision in the Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 
541, 547–48 (1994) (arguing that statutes, like contracts, are often intentionally left 
vague because it is too difficult to provide for all the possibilities and because 
future uncertainty means that it is best to allow courts to fill in the details later 
through a “quasi-legislative process”). 
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The WTO’s unique institutional structure may further warrant 
judicial rule making.  The WTO suffers, like many other 
international organizations, basic “positivist” predicaments 
stemming from the often stubborn and eccentric “wills” of states.  
The difficulty of converging more than 150 wills tends to make any 
legislation under the WTO extremely impracticable.  Legislation in 
the WTO is also compounded by its daunting decision making 
mechanism—either a consensus or supermajority in any important 
matter.174  Under these taxing circumstances, the WTO 
jurisprudence developed by the WTO panels and the AB should be 
given more weight in terms of the WTO’s nuanced institutional 
balance than in terms of the Montesquiean separation of powers 
notion that are better suited to the domestic context.175  After all, 
this is a useful manifestation of “judicial prudentialism,”176 rather 
than  reckless “judicial activism.” 
Critics of the AB might seize the textual semblance of Article 
17.6 (ii) to the Chevron doctrine and argue that the Article is a 
specific “rule” which must be directly applied, not constructed, by 
the WTO tribunal in the same manner in which the Chevron 
doctrine is applied in the U.S. court.177  However, if one categorizes 
 
174 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 
39 GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (“The decision-making and voting 
procedures of the WTO, although much improved over the GATT, still leave 
much to be desired.  It is not clear how the consensus practice will proceed, 
particularly given the large number of countries now or soon involved.”). 
175 See Donald M. McRae, The WTO in International Law: Traditional Continued 
or New Frontier?, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27, 40 (2000) (arguing that the WTO dispute 
settlement system fosters the “development of principles of international law 
through judicial decisions at a much faster pace than has occurred under existing 
international legal institutions”); Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism,’ Values, and 
International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 291, 301 (2000) (advocating the Appellate 
Body’s “enhanced role for a self-confident judiciary, filling in the gaps which 
states in their legislative capacity have been unwilling—or unable—to fill”); 
Steinberg, supra note 156, at 260 (stating policy arguments for a less deferential 
Appellate Body).  Cf. Shimon Shetreet, Judging in Society: The Changing Role of 
Courts, in THE ROLE OF COURTS IN SOCIETY 469 (Shimon Shetreet ed., 1988) 
(observing that “legislatures are [generally] slow to introduce law reforms to 
ensure that the law adapts to changing times and changing social and moral 
norms”).   
176 Cf. Russell Gabriel & Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International Law, 82 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 277, 283–84 (1988) (discussing the limits of judicial discretion). 
177 Regarding the distinction between “rules” and “standards,” see 
Trachtman, The WTO’s Domain, supra note 22, at 350–51 (defining a rule as a law 
that is specified in advance as to what conduct applies, and a standard as a 
guideline without specifying the conduct required or prohibited). 
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the Article as a more flexible “standard,” the WTO tribunal can 
certainly fill in the gap of an incomplete treaty, i.e., the WTO 
Antidumping Agreement.  In fact, considering the murky nature of 
negotiation history under the Uruguay Round over the anti-
dumping issues in general,178 it would be only logical to construe 
the Article as a standard whose real life applications have been 
delegated to the WTO tribunal.179  According to game theory, the 
purpose of this interpretive flexibility is to enhance “allocative 
efficiency.”180  One could reasonably speculate that the 
Antidumping Agreement would not have come to light if 
disagreeing negotiators had stubbornly clung to their own original 
preferences, which had been diametrically opposite. 
Despite its strong merits, judicial rule making by the WTO 
tribunal manifests itself in a much-nuanced fashion.  As José 
Alvarez observed, “[c]andid acknowledgment of judicial law-
making . . . is a rarity in international decisions.”181  In fact, Judge 
Jennings, one of the most respected ICJ judges, once wrote that 
“the most important requirement of the judicial function” appears 
to be applying preexisting norms even when it “creates law in the 
sense of developing, adapting, modifying, filling gaps, 
interpreting, or even branching out in a new direction . . . .”182  The 
WTO tribunal, like any other international tribunal, is rather 
reserved and circumspect in performing this inevitable judicial 
function.183  This approach results from the fact that the AB is all 
 
178 See Stewart, supra note 48. 
179 See Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, supra note 22, at 
351–52 (noting that a standard, as opposed to a rule, would rationally be placed in 
trade agreements because of less domestic scrutiny, and the ability for both sides 
to claim victory). 
180 Id. 
181 ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at 532. 
182 MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1996) 
(quoting Sir Robert Y. Jennings, The Judicial Function and the Rule of Law in 
International Relations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE TIME OF ITS CODIFICATION:  
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ROBERTO AGO 141, 142 (1987).  See ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at 
532, n. 38 (quoting Judge Jennings); Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, Multiple 
International Judicial Forums: A Reflection of the Growing Strength of International Law 
or Its Fragmentation?, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 929, 944 (2004) (observing that “judicial 
legislation at the international level is a well recognized occurrence, albeit within 
limits of judicial caution and restraint”). 
183 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, How to Promote the International Rule of Law? 
Contributions by the World Trade Organization Appellate Review System, 1 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 25, 25 (1998) (discussing some early WTO decisions where the AB is 
measured in judicial law-making).  See generally, Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional 
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too aware of members’ anxieties over its potential judicial activism 
and the subsequent encroachment on their sovereignty.  Therefore, 
the AB always endeavors to avoid implications that may lead some 
members to suspect that it overreaches its textually limited 
mandate under DSU, i.e., not adding to or diminishing members’ 
rights and obligations.  The AB’s well-documented preoccupation 
with textual interpretation, even when it in fact adopts teleological 
interpretation, attests to this caution.184 
4.2.2. The Ambiguous Nature of WTO Bargain 
As discussed above, critics of the AB seem to subscribe to a 
contractarian view on the multilateral trading system.  They 
basically view that invalidating zeroing is not what members, 
especially those members which advocate zeroing, had bargained 
for in the Uruguay Round negotiations.185  On the contrary, the real 
deal struck in the Uruguay Round, according to them, was one that 
bestowed considerable deference to domestic anti-dumping 
authorities, which is allegedly enshrined in Article 17.6 (ii) of the 
WTO Antidumping Agreement.  Those critics appear to deem this 
Article as a sacrosanct term of the Uruguay Round contract.  As a 
matter of fact, the Article was inserted at the eleventh hour in the 
Uruguay Round negotiation at the United States’ strong behest.  
No doubt the U.S. did not want the newly created, and more 
“judicialized,” WTO dispute settlement mechanism to restrain the 
operation of its politically sensitive domestic anti-dumping regime, 
which is a critical protectionist bulwark serving politically 
powerful domestic producers.  To them, Article 17.6 (ii) would be a 
 
Conceits: The WTO’s ‘Constitution’ and the Discipline of International Law, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 647, 658 (2006) (observing “[t]here can be little doubt that the AB’s larger, 
if implicit, message—that it will not adopt or articulate a ‘constitutional’ 
understanding of the WTO’s institutional architecture—was widely understood”). 
184 See generally Henrik Horn & Joseph H. H. Weiler, European Communities — 
Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent, in THE WTO CASE LAW 
OF 2002 248 (H. Horn & P.C. Mavroidis eds., 2005).  See also Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal 
Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. 
WORLD TRADE 605, 617 (2002) (observing that the AB emphasized the textual 
interpretation so as to avoid criticism that it has modified WTO members’ rights 
and obligations in the WTO treaty). 
185 See Panel Report, United States—Continued Existence and Application of 
Zeroing Methodology, Annex D-13, ¶ 34-36, WT/DS350/R (Oct. 1, 2008) (observing 
that there existed no consensus on zeroing at the time of Uruguay Round 
negotiations). 
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Trojan horse deliberately deployed in the middle of the 
multilateral trading system. 
However, an anachronistic, contractarian understanding of the 
WTO may overstate the positivist/realist nature of the multilateral 
trading system and thus fail to fully capture its true aspects.  
Concededly, the prototypical construct of the post-war global 
trading system was a sovereign contract dealing mostly with tariffs, 
i.e., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  The agreement 
was negotiated, signed and implemented by “contracting” parties.  
Under this originally positivist structure, both the formation and 
the operation of GATT would be determined by power disparity or 
the so-called “hegemony stability thesis” under which power is a 
main currency.186  Perhaps this is the reason why most criticisms of 
judicial activism are staged by political scientists or politicians, 
whose main language is power, not norms.187 
Yet, for the past half century the gravity of governance in the 
global trading system has shifted from power to norms on account 
of a remarkable institutional evolution that has transformed an 
erstwhile contract into a “system.”188  As the former Director of the 
WTO Appellate Body Secretariat Debra Steger once put appositely, 
the GATT turned into “something greater than a contract that could 
be withdrawn from by any contracting party whenever it found 
the obligations too onerous.”189  In the same vein, the nature of the 
WTO remedies is no longer obsessed with the “rebalancing” of 
their original negotiated matrices of gives-and-takes, but more 
attuned to norm-building.190  In sum, the WTO as a system, or a 
 
186 See Hans J. Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky, Political Limitations of the 
United Nations, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 143, 150 (Hans J. 
Morgenthau & George A. Lipsky eds., 1953) (noting that “the United Nations 
[has] not replaced power politics”). 
187 See, e.g., Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, 
and Domestic Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 INT’L ORG. 603, 603 (2000). 
188 See Sungjoon Cho, The Nature of Remedies in International Trade Law, 65 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 763, 769-71 (2004) [hereinafter Cho, Remedies]. 
189 Debra P. Steger, Afterword: The “Trade and . . .” Conundrum – A 
Commentary, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 135, 137 (2002) (emphasis added). In a similar 
context, it can be said that GATT evolved from an interest-driven “contract” to a 
norm-based “covenant.” See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 424-25 (2000) (discussing 
“contracts” and “covenants” as two different ways to view international law). 
190 Cho, Remedies, supra note 188, at 792–95. 
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“trade constitution,”191 continuously transforms both the content of 
international trade law and state actors’ behaviors192 in a way that 
creates stability and predictability in the “multilateral trading 
system.”193  From this perspective, the alleged term of the Uruguay 
Round contract, which is raised by the U.S. in a self-serving way, 
could (and should) not determine the legal destinies of measures in 
question. 
Even if one arguendo adheres to a contract analogy in 
interpreting Article 17.6 (ii), the United States is just one party to 
the contract.  Its interpretation of Article 17.6 (ii) must not be 
representative and thus authoritative.  As the AB held in LAN, 
“[t]he purpose of treaty interpretation under Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention is to ascertain the common intentions of the 
parties” which “cannot be ascertained on the basis of the subjective 
and unilaterally determined ‘expectations’ of one of the parties to a 
treaty.”194  At the same time, “[a] proper interpretation also would 
 
191 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 339–51 (2d ed. 1997) (characterizing the 
policies of the world trading system as “trade constitution”); JOHN H. JACKSON, 
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JURISPRUDENCE 101–04 (1998) 
(referring to the “broad” WTO constitution); John H. Jackson, Reflections on 
International Economic Law, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 25–28 (1996) (referring to 
the “constitutional law” of international trade organizations); John H. Jackson, 
Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 873, 873 
(1996); John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 511, 573–83 (2000).  Professor Cottier also notes “[w]hile the GATT 
was an agreement the purpose of which was almost exclusively the reduction of 
trade barriers, the WTO increasingly assumes constitutional functions in a 
globalizing economy.” Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Some 
Issues and Ideas, Paper delivered at the WTO Symposium of Non-Governmental 
Organizations on Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development, March 17–
18, 1998, available at http://www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/2260.pdf.  Cf. 
Brian F. Fitzgerald, Trade-Based Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing 
Substantive International Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 129 (1996–97) (arguing 
that “[t]he Uruguay Round of the GATT has presented us with a trade structure 
that no longer seeks only to deregulate or regulate in the names of some narrow 
universal principle of free trade, but that seeks to regulate sovereignties for the 
purpose of finding universality”). 
192 See ALVAREZ, supra note 166, at 588 (arguing that international 
organizations have changed and are continuing to change the international 
sources of law, their substantive content, and the actors that make them, including 
states themselves). 
193 Panel Report, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶ 
7.76, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999). 
194 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Customs Classification of 
Certain Computer Equipment, ¶84, WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, 
WT/DS68/AB/R (June 5, 1998). 
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have included an examination of the existence and relevance of 
subsequent practice,”195 such as strong objections to the zeroing 
practice expressed by other parties (to the contract), for example, 
the Friends of Antidumping.196 
More importantly, Article 17.6 eventually fails to deliver what 
sovereigntists believe they have earned through a bargain.  An 
alleged semblance of the Article to the Chevron doctrine does not 
necessarily accord this international norm the same doctrinal 
content as the putative domestic legal doctrine.  To sovereigntists’ 
disappointment, Steven Croley and John Jackson eloquently 
demonstrated why Article 17.6(ii) of the Antidumping Agreement 
must not be interpreted like the Chevron doctrine.197  First, an 
explicit use of different languages in two situations, which are 
“permissible” in Article 17.6(ii) and “reasonable” in the Chevron 
doctrine, tends to oppose a similar pattern of interpretation 
between the two.198  Second, as an international treaty, the 
Antidumping Agreement must be interpreted in accordance with 
those interpretive principles under the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of the Treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32, not with the 
United States’ rules of statutory construction.199  Finally, they aptly 
pointed out that certain underlying rationales in the Chevron 
doctrine, such as “agency expertise” and “administrative 
coordination” cannot find their places in the WTO context.200 
Carlos Manuel Vázquez has also echoed Croley and Jackson’s 
well-situated arguments.  He criticized the Chevron deference in the 
context of the Antidumping Agreement.  He has argued that 
“Chevron deference takes place in the context of horizontal judicial 
review, whereas WTO adjudication is vertical judicial review” and 
that the Chevron analogy, if used to interpret Article 17.6(ii), would 
be tantamount to requiring that “federal courts defer to state court 
interpretations of federal law.”201  Like Croley and Jackson, he also 
 
195 Id. ¶ 90. 
196 See supra note 136. 
197 See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard 
of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 205–06 
(1996). 
198 Id.  
199 Id. at 206. 
200 Id. at 206–11. 
201 Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO: 
Some Similarities and Differences, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. Rev. 587, 603 (2004) 
(emphasis added). 
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emphasized that the agency expertise rationale in the Chevron 
doctrine is no longer valid in the WTO context.  He incisively 
observed that applying this doctrine to the WTO would be 
tantamount to a U.S. court deferring its statutory interpretation to 
those who are being regulated.202 
The AB in U.S.—Continued Zeroing (2009) confirmed the futility 
of the Chevron analogy.  The AB ruled that: 
[A] permissible interpretation for purposes of the second 
sentence of Article 17.6(ii) is not the result of an inquiry that 
asks whether a provision of domestic law is “necessarily 
excluded” by the application of the Vienna Convention.  
Such an approach subverts the hierarchy between the treaty 
and municipal law.  It is the proper interpretation of a 
covered agreement that is the enterprise with which Article 
17.6(ii) is engaged, not whether the treaty can be 
interpreted consistently with a particular Member’s 
municipal law or with municipal laws of Members as they 
existed at the time of the conclusion of the relevant treaty.203 
In conclusion, a contractarian analogy, which zeroing 
advocates employ in justifying its validity, tends to oversubscribe 
to a positivist understanding of the WTO and thus runs the risk of 
a misguided assessment of the measure. 
4.2.3. The Enlightened Meaning of Sovereignty 
A central theme revealed by critics of the AB’s anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence is “sovereignty,” which carries a hallmark of the 
Lotus principle.  Under the well-known principle of public 
international law, sovereign states are capable of doing whatever 
they desire as long as no explicit prohibition exists under 
international law.204  Following this logic, WTO members would be 
free to adopt the zeroing practice because the WTO Anti-Dumping 
Code does not expressly ban such practice. 
Yet this “disarticulated” use of sovereignty may not do justice 
to the contemporary status of global market integration under the 
WTO system.205  There are plausible risks that protectionists may 
 
202 Id. at 604. 
203 U.S.—Continued Zeroing, supra note 87, at ¶ 273. 
204 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7). 
205 Wendt, supra note 25, at 393; Pogge, supra note 25. 
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seek refugee in an overarching claim of sovereignty.  It might be 
too extensive and inferential to accuse the AB’s decision on a 
regulatory issue such as zeroing of actually eroding the classical 
notion of sovereignty as “self-government.”206  Zeroing does not 
concern the sanctity of self-determination and non-interference in 
the area of national security as stipulated and protected under the 
UN Charter.  An “emotional appeal” through sovereignty hiding 
“a surrogate argument by opponents of some government 
proposal”207 risks foreclosing otherwise meaningful and 
constructive discourses on the allocation of regulatory competence 
between the WTO and its members.208 
 
206 See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic 
Law, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 841, 875–76 (2003) (challenging traditional views that 
international economic institutions are inherently “sovereignty-subverting”). 
207 John H. Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: The United States 
Acceptance and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 157, 187 (1997) [hereinafter Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty 
Debate].  See also Ronald A. Brand, Semantic Distinctions in an Age of Legal 
Convergence, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (1996) (arguing that “theories of 
sovereignty borrowed from prior centuries can no longer accommodate economic 
and political reality at the end of the twentieth century”).  Dan Sarooshi also 
documented a self-serving utilization of sovereignty as a surrogate argument for 
specific policy preferences.  He emphasized the essentially “contestable” nature of 
sovereignty by submitting that “[t]he meaning of the concept of sovereignty is 
largely contingent upon the text in which it figures.”  Dan Sarooshi, Sovereignty, 
Economic Autonomy, the United States, and the International Trading System: 
Representations of a Relationship, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651, 652 (2004).  In other words, 
the concept of sovereignty, despite its “prima facie categorical use,” is subject to 
“conceptions and interpretations that should be evaluated and maybe amended in 
order to account better for the values encompassed by these concepts.”  Id., at 654 
(quoting Samantha Besson, Sovereignty in Conflict: Post-Sovereignty or Mere Change 
of Paradigms?, in THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3–4 (S. Tierney & C. Warbrick eds., 2004)).  This view 
parallels that of Stephan Krasner who regarded sovereignty as “organized 
hypocrisy.”  STEPHAN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 9 (1999). 
208 See John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated 
Concept, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 784–85 (2003) (discussing how the WTO’s 
jurisprudence “exemplifies the tension between internationalism and national 
governments’ desires to govern and deliver to their demographic constituencies . . 
. .”); see also Raustiala, supra note 206, at 843 (observing that “prevailing 
sovereignty-based critiques are instead usually disguised arguments about 
reallocations of power and the creation of incentives and disincentives for policy 
choices”).  But cf. Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and the “Rule of Law”, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1027 (1985) (reviewing JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMPLEMENTING 
THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RULES (1984)) (arguing that “[t]he kind of international law-making envisioned by 
the authors cannot be easily reconciled with the American political tradition”). 
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Gravely, an invocation of a Baroque version of sovereignty 
runs the risk of nurturing a culture of “veto” among members, 
especially powerful members such as the United States, and 
consequently poisoning the atmosphere of international 
cooperation.  Those powerful countries tend to summon this ill-
defined concept whenever they find compliance with international 
law and cooperation within an international organization 
politically inconvenient and cumbersome.  This culture of veto 
may be spread to adventurous isolationism, which could provoke 
some governments to disconnect themselves from the WTO 
despite the prohibitively high cost.209  Undoubtedly, any of these 
consequences would be perilous both to the WTO and those 
countries which might self-excommunicate from the WTO in the 
name of sovereignty. 
It is imperative that in this highly interdependent international 
environment, trading nations, even the most powerful ones, should 
embrace a novel concept of sovereignty.  Trading nations should 
realize that all international solutions necessarily involve “a degree 
of intrusiveness into domestic governance,” which stresses the 
necessity of a cooperative mechanism, including “appropriate 
allocation of power” between international institutions and diverse 
national legal systems.210  In other words, an altering international 
context requires a more flexible concept of sovereignty211 which 
departs from that which is symbolized by the peremptory exercise 
of unbridled power.  Therefore, as Abraham Chayes and Antonia 
Chayes argued, nations should adopt the “new sovereignty” which 
is more mature, constructive, and participatory.212  For this 
purpose, trade norms should be “disaggregated” to make it 
possible to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
reinforcing particular norms.213  This approach will enable 
 
209 Raustiala, Rethinking Sovereignty, supra note 206, at 849.  He aptly viewed 
that states in fact join various international organizations to “lock-in desired 
policy outcomes” and thus make any exit difficult. Id. 
210 John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting, 3 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6-11 (2000). 
211 Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and 
International Law, 52 STAN. L. REV. 959, 966 (2000) (reviewing STEPHEN D. KRASNER, 
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999)) (introducing the “contingent and 
plastic” view of constructivists on sovereignty). 
212 See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995). 
213 Jackson, The Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate, supra note 207, at 187–88. 
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governments to identify and focus on important “policy” issues 
that confront the entire international community, such as anti-
dumping and the zeroing practice, without any unnecessary 
rhetorical escalation.214  Ironically, this new approach to 
sovereignty can actually help governments achieve their own 
policy objectives by taming parochialism in the name of 
international obligations.215 
5. THE LEGITIMACY OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 
5.1. An Exogenous (Political) Test 
Although the constitutional adjudication by the WTO tribunal 
may be firmly anchored by the WTO’s telos of anti-protectionism, 
and thus self-sustaining from the standpoint of the WTO as an 
autonomous international organization, such a macro, 
organizational sustainability is yet to be tested by the member-
driven political dynamics.  Some commentators cast serious doubts 
on the wisdom of constitutional adjudication itself.  According to 
them, constitutional adjudication may be unsustainable because it 
tends to short-circuit the necessary and proper political process 
which the subject matter of adjudication should have triggered.  
Therefore, they view that the AB’s interpretation must be tightly 
controlled by political safeguards to prevent it from creeping into 
the forbidden realm of constitutional adjudication. 
For example, Jeffrey Dunoff found constitutional narratives 
unpersuasive in general.  Dunoff discovered a “striking 
disjunction” in the debates of trade constitution between the “deep 
disciplinary anxieties” of trade law scholars and a positivistic 
reality check that “neither WTO texts nor practices suggest that the 
WTO is a constitutional entity.”216  He warned that constitutional 
 
214 Id. Cf. Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International 
Trade Relations, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 776 (1997) (asserting that nowadays 
more States wish to regulate trade relations by using norms, rather than through 
sovereignty and flexibility). 
215 McGinnis argued that the WTO, unlike many sovereigntists’ lamentations, 
reinforces its members’ sovereignty by protecting them from their Madisonian 
constitutional failures precipitated by rent-seeking special interests or “factions.” 
John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of Global Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
381 (2000). 
216 Dunoff, supra note 96, at 647, 649.  He observed that “[t]here is no 
constitutional court, no constitutional convention, no constitutional drafting 
process, and no readily identifiable constitutional moment” and that “on their 
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discourse as a rhetorical strategy adopted by trade law scholars 
might be “self-defeating” in that it tends to invoke the very politics 
that it wants to avoid.217  Dunoff might find the vindication of his 
warning in sovereigntists’ lambasting against the AB’s teleological 
interpretation. 
In a similar fashion, one might submit that the very notion of 
trade constitution or trade constitutionalism as an apolitical 
discipline would be even undesirable.  According to Jan Klabbers, 
the “idea of overcoming politics by insisting on adhering to certain 
fixed values” would be unlikely to work since “reference to those 
values itself is immensely and intensely political.”218  Furthermore, 
Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis viewed that the WTO 
constitution as a Madisonian pre-commitment to resist the rent-
seeking protectionism by special interest groups might be 
detrimental because “it is an attempt to take politics out of the 
global equation when on the contrary it needs to be brought back 
in.”219 
These criticisms are not without merits.  In a formal matter, the 
WTO panel or the AB is merely to “assist” the Dispute Settlement 
Body, i.e., the General Council, to “settle” disputes between 
Members by delivering their “recommendations.”220  More 
importantly, these recommendations should not “add to or 
diminish” members’ rights and obligations.221  Also, over-
emphasizing this judicial governance in the WTO, especially 
through a constitutional lens, risks trivializing recognizable political 
checks against the WTO panel or the AB, such as WTO members’ 
“authoritative interpretation” which might potentially override 
any panel or AB decision.222  These risks tend to invite more 
 
face, the Uruguay Round texts lack a number of features often associated with 
constitutional entities.”  Id. at 650–51. 
217 Id. at 649. 
218 Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism Lite, 1 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 31, 54 (2004) 
(quoted in Dunoff, supra note 96, at 665). 
219 See Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Legitimacy and Global Governance: 
Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND 
LEGITIMACY: THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 227 (Roger B. 
Porter et al. eds. 2001). 
220 DSU, supra note 157, art. 19.1. 
221 Id. arts. 3.2, 19.2 (stating that the Panel cannot augment or diminish states’ 
rights and obligations in the covered agreements). 
222 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 9.2 (stating that the Ministerial 
Conference and General Council have exclusive authority to adopt interpretations 
of this Agreement and Multilateral Trade Agreements). 
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fundamental criticisms regarding the WTO tribunal’s alleged lack 
of accountability or more broadly the democracy deficit.  One of 
these critics contends that the WTO produces “quasi-
constitutional” rules (“generativity”) flowing from the confidential 
WTO tribunal (“insularity”).223  According to this position, the 
WTO’s substantive virtue—free trade—may become a potential 
threat to the democracy of its members, including (or especially) 
the United States in the absence of any democratic disciplines, such 
as those under the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act.224 
One might suspect that those political risks come at a price that 
WTO members should willingly pay to secure the integrity of “an 
integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading 
system.”225  Yet these risks might not necessarily be high, especially 
as long as domestic political economy could accommodate the 
AB’s constitutional adjudication.  Judith Goldstein and Richard 
Steinberg insightfully observed that the U.S. Congress has recently 
tolerated “de facto delegation” of trade authority to the WTO’s 
judicial law-making function.226  They attributed such domestic 
political tolerance to the WTO’s judicial activism to certain 
 
223 See Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 401, 415 
(2000) (explaining the view that the WTO is factionalized, with one-sided factions 
using trade policy to their own business benefit). 
224 Id. at 418–19.  Ironically, the way in which certain Western countries 
administer anti-dumping measures domestically fails to meet their own 
democratic standards.  For example, the U.S. Administrative Procedural Act does 
not apply to anti-dumping proceedings, raising due process questions in the anti-
dumping administration.  See Hilary K. Josephs, The Multinational Corporation, 
Integrated International Production, and the United States Antidumping Laws, 5 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 51, 66 (1997); Theodore W. Kassinger, Antidumping Duty 
Investigations, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF UNITED STATES REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1, 16–20 (Charles R.  Johnston, Jr. ed., 1989); see also Elof 
Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 48 C.C.P.A. 91 (1960) (ruling that the APA was not 
applicable to dumping investigations).  Moreover, even if domestic industries’ 
first attempt does not prevail in an anti-dumping complaint, they can refile the 
same complaint until they eventually prevail because unlike in other civil 
proceedings, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to 
the anti-dumping proceeding.  Procedure for Initiating a Countervailing Duty 
Investigation, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(a), 1673a(a) (stating that a countervailing duty 
investigation is initiated by administering authority when the authority 
determines that a formal investigation is warranted).  See also Josephs, supra, at 66. 
225 WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl. 
226 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate?: 
Effects of WTO Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, LAW & 
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 07-14, at 36–37 (discussing how the Appellate 
Body may successfully push for trade openness in the United States and the EU). 
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transformative features in the U.S. trade politics.227  First, export-
oriented producers have propped up their lobbying effects as they 
have witnessed “a clear and credible loss” from protection touted 
by import-competing groups.228  Second, trade liberalization tends 
to be “self-reinforcing” since these protectionist lobbies “peel off” 
as they become unable to sustain protection.229  Third, domestic 
“elites and leaders” tend to regard trade liberalization and market 
openness as advantageous to the national interest.230 
5.2. An Endogenous (Legal) Test 
In contrast to the aforementioned exogenous (political) test, an 
apolitical, i.e., normative, foundation for constitutional 
adjudication derives nowhere but from an “internal” dimension of 
law, namely, the way in which members interpret, react and 
respond to those constitutional decisions of the WTO tribunal, not 
as “one-time grudging compliance,” but as “habitual internalized 
obedience.”231 
This self-legitimizing osmosis of constitutional adjudication 
from the WTO level into the domestic legal realm does not remain 
a mere academic imagination.  Empirical confirmations are legion 
as to real world examples of such legal osmosis.  The reactions 
from the EU and the U.S. government to the AB’s anti-zeroing 
decisions provide cases in point.  For example, although the EU 
was one of the long-standing users of the zeroing practice, it has 
boldly changed its policy direction in a way that fully conforms to 
the AB’s ruling since it lost the very first case in EC—Bed Linen.  
Instead of resisting the AB’s decisions, it has elected to go after 
another main user, the United States.232  Even the U.S. government 
(DOC) has recently modified, albeit only partially, its long-
standing zeroing practice in the weighted-average-to-weighted-
average comparison in an attempt to comply with the AB’s 
 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 38. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. at 39. 
231 See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE 
L.J. 2599, 2655 (1997) (discussing how institutional habits lead nations to 
compliance in order to avoid friction). 
232 See supra Section 2.3.1. 
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decisions, despite severe resistance from the special interest groups 
as well as the Congress which is captured by these groups.233 
This legal osmosis or “internalization” of the WTO’s 
constitutional adjudication leads to a symbiotic co-existence 
between the WTO system and domestic legal regimes.  In fact, 
trade constitution can contribute even to achieving domestic 
constitutional goals since the former can provide an effective check 
against a Madisonian failure (parochialism) in the domestic 
arena.234  Public choice theorists teach us that gains from trade are 
often underrepresented while its costs are overrepresented.235  
Under these circumstances, constitutional adjudication tends to 
empower local voices for free trade and competition.  For example, 
since the WTO rulings on zeroing, U.S. domestic consumer groups 
have stepped up their lobbying efforts to the government with a 
view to the elimination of all zeroing practices that serve the 
interests of certain domestic producers at the expense of U.S. 
consumers and consuming industries.236 
 
233 See Antidumping Proceedings: Calculation of the Weighted-Average 
Dumping Margin During an Antidumping Investigation; Final Modification 71 
Fed. Reg. 77,722 (Dec. 27, 2006) (outlining the DOC’s modified antidumping 
investigation methodology); Rossella Brevetti, Commerce Makes Change in Dumping 
Methodology to Comply with WTO Case, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 26 (Jan. 4, 2007) 
(showing an example of internalization through “executive action,” such as the 
change of administrative interpretation).  See Koh, supra note 231, at 2657 (“Legal 
internalization occurs when an international norm is incorporated into the 
domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative 
action, or some combination of the three.”). 
234 See Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of 
Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, LAW & ECON. RESEARCH 
PAPER SERIES, No. 07-15, at 2–3 (arguing that the WTO’s regulatory scheme shifted 
from the legislative to the judicial sector by “freeing member states from capture 
by entrenched domestic interests”). 
235 See Sungjoon Cho, Toward a New Economic Constitution: Judicial Disciplines 
on Trade Politics, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167, 184–86 (2007) (discussing how 
protectionist trade practice can be detrimental to U.S. economics). 
236 See Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (“CITAC”), Rebuttal 
Comments on the Commerce Department’s “Zeroing” Proposal, 71 Fed. Reg. 
11189, May 4, 2006, available at http://www.citac.info/about/issues/zeroing 
/CITAC_On_Zeroing_2300285_1.pdf (urging the Department of Commerce to 
“eliminate zeroing from all antidumping calculation methodologies”) (emphasis 
added); Robin Lanier, A Letter to Secretary of Commerce (Re: “Zeroing” of 
Duties), Jan. 6, 2005 (proposing to “eliminate the practice of zeroing in all 
dumping cases”).  Harold Koh defines this phenomenon as “legislative 
internalization” which “occurs when domestic lobbying embeds international law 
norms into binding domestic legislation or even constitutional law that officials of 
a noncomplying government must then obey as part of the domestic legal fabric.” 
Koh, supra note 231, at 2657. 
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Even if certain domestic producers may attempt to preserve the 
zeroing practice in the domestic court, which usually renders huge 
deference to agencies like the DOC under the Chevron doctrine, the 
court can still respect the decisions of the WTO (AB) under the 
Charming Betsy doctrine, which prescribes that U.S. law should be 
interpreted consistently with international law.237  In other words, 
between two possible statutory constructions of the antidumping 
statute, i.e., one which does permit zeroing and the other which 
does not, the U.S. court could choose the latter since the WTO 
tribunal unambiguously ruled against zeroing.  To this extent, any 
modicum of deference which the DOC would have enjoyed under 
the second prong of the Chevron doctrine is squeezed to nil.238 
In sum, this “transnational legal process,” which internalizes 
the WTO norms on zeroing via the executive, legislative and 
judicial channels, continuously enhances the WTO members’ 
susceptibility to the WTO’s constitutional adjudication.  As WTO 
members repeat and regularize this process, and thus as domestic 
law becomes enmeshed with “sticky” international law,239 their 
compliance with the outcome of constitutional adjudication 
 
237 This situation may fall within the rubric of “judicial internalization” which 
Harold Koh defines as an implicit incorporation of international law into the 
domestic legal system through interpreting existing statutes harmoniously with 
international law or as an explicit incorporation via “transnational public law 
litigation.” Koh, supra note 231, at 2657. 
238 A recent North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”) Article 1904 
bi-national panel (the Mittal panel) has followed the AB’s anti-zeroing 
jurisprudence by invoking the Charming Betsy doctrine.  NAFTA Article 1904.2 
requires the tribunal whose mandate is a judicial review on government’s 
decisions on trade remedy issues such as zeroing to apply the same laws, 
regulations and even standards of review as a court of a defending country (the 
U.S. in this dispute).  In this sense, the Mittal panel spoke on behalf of the U.S. 
court.  It ruled that “zeroing seems inconsistent . . . with both the underlying 
principle of the Charming Betsy canon, to respect the law of nations wherever 
possible, and the United States’ Uruguay Round negotiation goal of obtaining an 
effective dispute-resolution system.”  In the Matter of Carbon and Certain Alloy 
Steel Wire Rod from Canada, USA-CDA-2006-1094-04, Nov. 28, 2007, at 38.  But 
see Elizabeth C. Seastrum, Chevron Deference and Charming Betsy: Is There a Place 
for the Schooner in the Standard of Review of Commerce Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Determinations?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 229, 238–39 (2003) 
(concluding that the Charming Betsy doctrine should not undermine the operation 
of the Chevron doctrine). 
239 See Koh, supra note 227, at 2654–55 (“Domestic decisionmaking becomes 
‘enmeshed’ with international legal norms, as institutional arrangements for the 
making and maintenance of an international commitment become entrenched in 
domestic legal and political processes.”). 
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becomes ever closer to a “default pattern.”240  Furthermore, in most 
cases trade constitution is firmly in harmony with fundamental 
principles of domestic (constitutional) law, such as free interstate 
commerce and anti-parochialism.  This “sovereignty-enhancing” 
aspect of internalization reinforces its self-legitimizing nature.241  
Under these circumstances, members’ “loyalty” to the WTO regime 
mitigates, or even replaces, their initial demand for “voice” or 
threat of “exit.”242 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article has challenged major critiques to the recent WTO 
case law that invalidated zeroing in a radical departure from the 
old GATT case law, which legalized the same practice.  The article 
has argued that critics to the AB’s zeroing decisions misconstrue 
the nature of the WTO, its judicial review, and sovereignty itself.  
The article has also demonstrated why, and how, the recent WTO 
zeroing jurisprudence can be appreciated as a form of 
constitutional adjudication.  Finally, it has contended that 
constitutional adjudication is self-legitimizing to the extent that 
such adjudication communicates with the domestic legal system 
via various forms of internalization, be it a judicial 
accommodation, as regards the Charming Betsy doctrine, or a policy 
change at the executive level.  After all, compliance leads to 
legitimacy insomuch as legitimacy renders compliance pull. 
This mutually reinforcing dynamic between internalization and 
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication on zeroing may crystallize 
into a certain cultural phenomenon.  In this regard, “constitutional 
culture” may be defined as the “cultural cohesion that habitually 
accepts the propriety and necessity of constitutional 
compliance.”243  In fact, internalization itself is “constitutive” and 
 
240 Id.  See also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 172, at 935 (observing that some 
international tribunals’ rulings can “mobilize compliance constituencies to press 
governments to adhere to their treaty obligations”) (emphasis added). 
241 See ALVAREZ, supra note 167, at 618.  Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming 
Democracy: The Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 272–73 (2008) (suggesting that inter-judicial coalitions could 
enhance democratic governance). 
242 See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 76–105 (1970) 
(exploring the impact of loyalty on the “voice” and “exit” dynamics). 
243 Allan Ides, The Emerging Transnational Constitution: Introduction, 37 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 187, 188 (2003). 
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thus facilitative of constitutional culture.244  The WTO’s 
constitutional culture denotes the “generally shared” and 
“intersubjective” understanding of the WTO’s ultimate goal (telos) 
and the normative universe (nomos) in which such a goal is 
pursued.245  Within the WTO’s nomos defined by its telos, an 
unremitting interaction, or discourse, among members of the 
global trading community forms, and fortifies, the WTO’s 
constitutional culture via a communitarian mechanism of 
habituation. 
Importantly, the constitutional culture should also be didactic.  
The WTO’s constitutional jurisprudence, no matter how much it 
has evolved thus far, is still remote and inaccessible to ordinary 
people.  Most people, even scholars in this field, associate it with 
esoteric codes, which can be deciphered only by certain 
cognoscenti.246  With such a low level of comprehensibility, the 
legal force cannot overcome the short-term protectionist politics 
which is often well-organized and thus very effective in capturing 
trade policy-makers.  Therefore, the public should become further 
educated in international trade law and trade constitution so that 
well-informed deliberation, not misleading protectionist banners, 
will guide their political choices.247  The necessity of public 
education and social marketing on the WTO’s constitutional 
jurisprudence may be analogous to the reason why American 
citizens, not only legal scholars, are taught on certain paramount 
constitutional jurisprudence, such as Marbury and Brown.  At this 
juncture, the academia bears a critical responsibility in framing and 
dispersing discourses on the trade constitution and constitutional 
adjudication.248  Such discourses will eventually provide the public 
with helpful heuristics with which to better comprehend 
 
244 Koh, supra note 231, at 2646. 
245 See, e.g., Lang, supra note 26, at 84–85, 95, 105–06 (employing a 
“constructivist” perspective on the WTO system); Robert M. Cover, Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (observing that “no set of legal 
institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give 
it meaning.”); id. at 9 (defining nomos as a “present world constituted by a system 
of tension between reality and vision”). 
246 See Sungjoon Cho, A New Agenda for Peace: International Trade Law as a 
Practical Discourse, in TRADE AS THE GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?: 
CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 63 (Padideh Ala’i et al eds. 2006) 
(discussing the complexity of WTO jurisprudence). 
247 Id. 
248 I owe this insight to David Gerber. 
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international trade law, thereby paving a propitious ground for the 
WTO’s constitutional culture. 
In conclusion, the WTO’s constitutional culture liberates us 
from a long-standing “positivist nostrum” based on an outmoded 
belief that “multilateral mechanisms for making global law, 
binding on the international community as a whole, do not 
exist.”249  Only this liberation can disabuse trading nations of their 
misguided mercantilist interests, which zeroing represents, and 
redefine their identities and interests within the global trading 




249 ALVAREZ, supra note 99, at 586–87. 
250 See generally Cho, Gemeinschaft, supra note 26.  From a standpoint of 
sociological institutionalism, Martha Finnermore envisioned “continuing and 
even increasing adherence to multilateralism—even when it runs contrary to 
expressed national interests—because it embodies some set of values central to the 
larger world culture.”  Martha Finnemore, Norms, Culture, and World Politics: 
Insights from Sociology’s Institutionalism, 50 INT’L ORG. 325, 339 (1996). 
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